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phase in developing a meaningful accountability structure for TNCs 
under international law. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 873 
I. THE BYSTANDER BACKGROUND .................................................. 877 
A. THE BYSTANDER RHETORIC .................................................... 880 
B. INDIA’S BHOPAL DISASTER ..................................................... 883 
C. IMPLEMENTING A BYSTANDER THEORY .................................. 885 
II. OUT OF THE FIERY FURNACE: A REVIEW OF THE HISTORY OF 
BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS ON THE U.N. STAGE  ................. 887 
A. THE U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT .................................................. 890 
B. THE U.N. NORMS .................................................................... 897 
1. Textual Analysis ............................................................... 898 
2. The Backlash .................................................................... 901 
C. THE HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL’S MANDATES TO SPECIAL 
REPRESENTATIVE JOHN RUGGIE .............................................. 906 
1. The 2006 Interim Report .................................................. 907 
2. The 2007 Report .............................................................. 908 
3. The 2008 Report: “Protect, Respect and Remedy” ......... 911 
III. THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES ........................................................... 914 
 A. THE BACKGROUND ................................................................... 916 
B. TEXTUAL ANALYSIS ................................................................. 918 
C. IMPACT ON A BYSTANDER FRAMEWORK ................................... 921 
1. The tripartite relationship in human rights abuses ......... 923 
2. Sphere of influence and the bystander framework ........... 924 
3. The bystander framework and the TNC’s relationship 
with the State .................................................................... 926 
4. The bystander framework and the special duty of the 
TNC .................................................................................. 929 
D. THE FAILINGS OF THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES ............................ 930 
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................ 932 
APPENDIX A (A TIMELINE OF BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS) ......... 936 
APPENDIX B ......................................................................................... 940 
      
2012] “THE END OF THE BEGINNING?” 873 
INTRODUCTION 
Ruggie has gone to great lengths to analyze the environment in 
which multinational corporations operate today, particularly what 
he calls ‘governance gaps’ or ‘weak governance zones’—areas 
where few of the underpinnings of law and order exist. ‘This 
authority vacuum, or governance gap, often leads responsible 
companies to stumble when faced with some of the most difficult 
choices imaginable, or to try and perform de facto governmental 
roles in local communities for which they are ill-equipped. Less 
responsible firms take advantage of the asymmetry of power they 
enjoy to do as they will.1 
On June 16, 2011, the U.N. Human Rights Council unanimously 
endorsed2 the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 
(“Guiding Principles” or “Principles”).3 With its vote to endorse these 
principles, an era of seismic shifts regarding business and human rights 
came to an end. In a matter of twelve years, the landscape of 
international human rights law changed dramatically. In this time frame, 
Transnational Corporations (“TNCs”) went from lurking in the shadows 
of the human rights debate, to being placed on the United Nations’ 
center stage, a spotlight firmly fixed upon them.4 Much of that change 
came at the hand of John Ruggie and his team. Acting as Special 
Representative5 to the U.N. on business and human rights6 issues from 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Robert A. Senser, Big Business and the U.N.: Toward a New Framework for 
Corporate Responsibility, AM. THE NAT’L CATHOLIC WKLY., Dec. 1, 2008, available at      
http://www.americanmagazine.org/content/article.cfm?article_id=11253 (internal 
quotes omitted). 
 2. Scott Jerbi, U.N. Adopts Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights – 
What Comes Next?, IHRB (Jun. 17, 2011), http://www.ihrb.org/commentary/staff/un_a 
dopts_guiding_principles_on_business_and_human_rights.html. 
 3. These Principles were drafted by Special Representative John Ruggie. 
 4. See, e.g., Olivia Ward, 60 Years Later, Fight for Rights Carries on; in an Era 
of Turmoil, Many Wonder Whether the U.N.’s Universal Vow is a Work in Progress, 
THE TORONTO STAR, Dec. 9, 2008, at AA.1. 
 5. The U.N. frequently appoints people to act as Special Representatives for 
various missions or mandates that it wants to complete. For a sample list, see Special 
and Personal Representatives and Envoys of the Secretary-General, the Americas, 
UN.ORG, http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/sites/srsg/americas.htm (last visited Jan. 
3, 2012). The Special Representative acts at the behest of the appointing body at the 
U.N., performing various tasks and acting as a spokesperson for the U.N. within the 
scope of their mandate. In this instance, then Secretary-General Kofi Anan appointed 
John Ruggie as the Special Representative on the issue of human rights and 
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2005–2011, Ruggie analyzed the problems that plague TNCs regarding 
human rights issues and set forth his proposal to help solve the 
problem.7 
However, while Ruggie’s work is transformational, it is still 
incomplete.8 The Guiding Principles are significant, but they are non-
                                                                                                                 
Transnational Corporations. See Press Release, U.N. Secretary-General, Secretary-
General Appoints John Ruggie of United States, Special Representative on Issue of 
Hum. Rts., Transnat’l Corp., other Bus. Enter., U.N. Press Release SG/A/934 (July 28, 
2005), available at http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2005/sga934.doc.htm. 
 6. Generally speaking, the term business and human rights encompasses a broad 
range of activity relating to such diverse matters as trade, labor, and corporate 
governance. The idea underlying the term is that business entities are somehow 
implicated in circumstances that raise human rights issues. In this Article, I will use the 
term broadly, discussing TNCs’ responsibility and potential accountability within the 
context of human rights violations. 
 7. Ruggie’s contributions came under two mandates created by the U.N. Human 
Rights Council. The first mandate, which was created in April 2005, requested among 
other things that the Special Representative “identify[] and clarify[] existing standards 
of corporate responsibility and accountability with regard to human rights.” Id. The 
second mandate, which the U.N. issued after Ruggie completed his first mandate, 
requested that Ruggie provide recommendations to the Council on operationalizing the 
framework for business and human rights. Special Representative of the Secretary-
General on the Issue of Hum. Rts. and Transnat’l Corp. and Other Bus. Enter., Business 
and Human Rights: Further Steps Toward the Operationalization of the “Protect, 
Respect and Remedy” Framework, Hum. Rts. Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/27 (Apr. 
9, 2010) (by John Ruggie), available at http://198.170.85.29/Ruggie-report-2010.pdf. 
Although the U.N. issued two separate mandates, Ruggie often refers to them as one 
mandate in interviews. See Interview by John Sherman with Professor John Ruggie, 
Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General on Bus. & Hum. Rts, Int’l Bar 
Ass’n Webcast (Apr. 19, 2010), available at http://www.ibanet.org/Article/Detail.aspx? 
ArticleUid=4b5233cb-f4b9-4fcd-9779-77e7e85e4d83 [hereinafter Interview by John 
Sherman]. 
 8. Ruggie himself acknowledges this. In the Guiding Principles, he states 
“Council endorsement of the Guiding Principles, by itself, will not bring business and 
human rights challenges to an end. But it will mark the end of the beginning.” Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Hum. Rts. and Transnat’l Corp. 
and Other Bus. Enter., Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: 
Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, Hum. 
Rts. Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011) (by John Ruggie), available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/A-HRC-17-31_AEV.pdf [hereinafter 
Guiding Principles]. 
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binding. Victims of human rights abuses who lack the means of redress 
in their domestic sphere are still largely unable to turn to international 
law in order to hold TNCs accountable for their role in the abuse. This 
can lead to significant human rights abuses left unchecked, particularly 
in weak governance zones, where the State itself either perpetrates the 
abuse or is unwilling to stop the aggressor. While many are hopeful that 
Ruggie has laid the foundation in the Principles for future accountability 
mechanisms, the Principles themselves reject this as an appropriate use 
of its framework. 
Previously, I have proposed a new paradigm for looking at TNCs9 
under international law, namely that of a bystander.10 The basis for my 
proposal was that TNCs employ the rhetoric of the bystander to try to 
avoid responsibility for human rights violations under international law 
by confusing and dominating the dialogue on corporate accountability.11 
I maintained that until we find an accountability framework that 
incorporated the bystander name, TNCs would continue to control the 
debate regarding their role in human rights abuses and prevent the 
creation of an accountability framework that incorporates TNCs.12 
Examining the Guiding Principles from a bystander perspective will 
                                                                                                                 
 9. Transnational Corporations is just one of many terms that have been employed 
for this corporate structure. Other terms, such as multi-business enterprises and 
multinational corporations, are also used. I adopt the use of Transnational Corporations 
for two reasons: 1) this term has appeared most often in my review of the United 
Nations’ documents themselves; and 2) TNC most accurately conveys the jurisdictional 
uniqueness of these enterprises in my view. In addition, in Ruggie’s first official report 
to the Human Rights Council, he points out that oftentimes state-owned companies or 
business enterprises that reside in only one jurisdiction are the greatest abusers of 
human rights. Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Hum. 
Rts. and Transnat’l Corp. and Other Bus. Enter., Business and Human Rights: Mapping 
International Standards of Responsibility and Accountability for Corporate Acts, Hum. 
Rts. Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/035 (Feb. 9, 2007) (by John Ruggie), available at 
http://www.business-humanrights.org/SpecialRepPortal/Home/ReportstoUNHumanRig 
htsCouncil/2007 [hereinafter 2007 Report]. While that may be true, from an 
accountability standpoint, intrastate corporations do not present the same accountability 
issues that arise when corporations operate in multiple jurisdictions. These latter issues 
are my focus in this Article.  
 10. See Jena Martin Amerson, What’s in a Name? Transnational Corporations and 
Bystanders Under International Law, 85 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1 (2011). 
 11. At its core, the TNC’s bystander strategy is the following: in the wake of 
accusations from human rights advocates, TNCs maintain that they were merely 
bystanders (i.e., innocent third parties) to the underlying events, helpless to stop the 
tragedy from occurring. Id. at 5. 
 12. Id. 
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further enhance the discussion on the best accountability paradigms for 
TNCs in the realm of human rights abuses. 
Using mainly primary source materials (such as the U.N.’s own 
foundational documents and contemporaneous articles and commentary 
from that time period),13 this article will examine the short history14 of 
business and human rights at the U.N. and analyze the impact that its 
work will have on international human rights law generally, as well as 
the bystander paradigm specifically. While the Guiding Principles 
represent a significant step forward in the area of business and human 
rights, more work needs to be done at the foundational level before 
business and human rights law becomes firmly entrenched at the 
international level. By analyzing these new normative goals from a 
bystander perspective, I hope to advance the debate regarding a feasible 
accountability model for TNCs under international law. 
Part I of this Article offers some background on the bystander 
paradigm for TNCs. Part II provides a comprehensive15 documentation 
                                                                                                                 
 13. In the introduction to his 2008 Official Report to the Human Right Council, 
Ruggie stated that “the international community is still in the early stages of adapting 
the human rights regime to provide more effective protection to individuals and 
communities against corporate-related human rights harm.” Special Representative of 
the Secretary-General on the Issue of Hum. Rts. and Transnat’l Corp. and Other Bus. 
Enter., Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights, ¶ 
1, Hum. Rts. Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008) (by John Ruggie), 
available at http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/issues_doc/human_rights/Human_R 
ights_Working_Group/29Apr08_7_Report_of_SRSG_to_HRC.pdf [hereinafter Respect 
Framework]. Because scholarship in this area is still in its infancy, and given that most 
of the work on this subject for the last twelve years has come from the Special 
Representative’s office, examining the developments under Ruggie’s mandates is most 
effective for this Article’s assessment of business and human rights issues. 
 14. While there are many U.N. mandates and treaties that inform the issue of 
business and human rights, this Article will focus primarily on those that specifically 
address corporate responsibility—namely the U.N. Norms, The U.N. Global Compact, 
and the reports produced by Special Representative John Ruggie. 
 15. Comprehensive, but not exhaustive, Ruggie’s work alone in the last six years 
has generated hundreds of reports, addenda, responses, commentaries and workshop 
projects. A thorough analysis of each is beyond the scope of this Article. For a list of all 
the documents that were prepared by or submitted to Ruggie in connection with his 
work, see List of Documents Prepared by and Submitted to SRSG on Business and 
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of the seismic shift that has occurred in the area of business and human 
rights in the last twelve years. While this section begins with Kofi 
Annan’s declaration regarding business and human rights through the 
work of the Global Compact, it will focus primarily on the U.N. Norms 
on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other 
Business Entities with Regard to Human Rights (“U.N. Norms”) and its 
aftermath—specifically examining the work of Special Representative 
John Ruggie and his mandates. Part III of this Article analyzes the 
Guiding Principles—the culmination of Ruggie’s mandates—and 
discusses how the three pillars (“Protect,” “Respect,” and “Remedy”) 
upon which the Guiding Principles are based affect the bystander 
paradigm. Part IV offers an analysis of the Guiding Principles, 
examining how it compares to its main predecessor, the U.N. Norms, as 
well as how it has had an impact on the bystander framework. 
That the Guiding Principles will likely have an impact on 
international human rights law—now and in the future—is a premise 
beyond dispute. Thus, the Principles are truly the end of the beginning. 
Nonetheless, until a workable accountability framework is developed, 
the end of the beginning is all we have. 
I. THE BYSTANDER BACKGROUND 
One of the long-standing struggles that scholars and advocates have 
wrestled with are TNCs’ position in the international legal framework 
with respect to human rights violations.16 These violations are 
                                                                                                                 
Human Rights (Aug. 10, 2010), available at http://198.170.85.29/Ruggie-docs-list.pdf 
[hereinafter Document List]. This list is current as of August 2010. 
 16. One of the most comprehensive discussions of this issue comes from Steven 
Ratner. See Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal 
Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443 (2001). Other scholars have also joined the 
discussion over the years. See, e.g., Nien-hê Hsieh, The Obligations of Transnational 
Corporations: Rawlsian Justice and the Duty of Assistance, 14 BUS. ETHICS Q., no. 4, 
643–661 (2004); Kenneth Paul Kinyua, The Accountability of Multinational 
Corporations for Human Rights Violations: A Critical Analysis of Select Mechanisms 
and Their Potential to Protect Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Developing 
Countries (Working Paper Series No. K33, Sept. 30, 2009), available at http://papers.ss 
rn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1599842 (critically analyzing the effectiveness of 
the U.N. Human Rights Norms as a development in customary international law); 
David Kinley & Junko Tadaki, From Talk to Walk: The Emergence of Human Rights 
Responsibilities for Corporations at International Law, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 931 (2004) 
(arguing that the current state-based framework for human rights accountability is 
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numerous. Among them are torture, gender discrimination, labor rights 
violations and environmental harm.17 They also arise in numerous 
scenarios. For example, villagers are subject to rape, torture, and death 
after a TNC begins operations in their village; afterwards, the TNC may 
disavow any involvement.18 An explosion at a plant in India causes 
thousands of deaths and incalculable harm to the environment; corporate 
executives in the U.S. disclaim any legal responsibility.19 Riots and 
deaths come after a TNC wins a contract to privatize Bolivia’s water, 
and Bolivians are denied access to water at a reasonable price; yet the 
TNC claims that it was not involved in any of the actions that led to the 
abuses.20 To compound the complexity, there is no current legal 
                                                                                                                 
inadequate and duties for TNCs under international law should be implemented); Paul 
Redmond, Transnational Enterprise and Human Rights: Options for Standard Setting 
and Compliance, 37 INT’L LAW. 69 (2003) (arguing for an international legal 
framework for TNCs); Larissa van den Herik & Jernej Netmar Cernic, Regulating 
Corporations Under International Law: From Human Rights to International Criminal 
Law and Back Again, 8 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 725 (2010) (exploring the idea of bringing 
corporate human rights responsibility into an international criminal law paradigm to 
remedy the existing enforcement gap); Rachel J. Anderson, Reimagining Human Rights 
Law: Toward Global Regulation of Transnational Corporations, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 
183 (2010) (arguing for the creation of global human rights law, as distinct from 
international human rights law, to be the law paradigm for TNCs); Cynthia Williams, 
Corporate Social Responsibility in an Era of Economic Globalization, 35 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 705 (2002) (arguing that a new paradigm needs to be created that incorporates 
the reality of how corporations do business today). 
 17. Kinley & Junko Tadaki, supra note 16, at 934. 
 18. Id. 
 19. See discussion infra Section I.B. and accompanying footnotes. 
 20. These scenarios are based on, but not identical to, situations involving the 
following corporations: Unocal, Union Carbide, and Bechtel. For brief summaries of 
each (that also allude to strategies by TNCs that implicate a bystander strategy), see 
Boston Common Asset Management, Indian Judge Orders Dow to Explain Shielding of 
Subsidiary in Bhopal Criminal Case, CSR WIRE (Jan 11. 2005), http://www.csrwire.co 
m/press_releases/20781-Indian-Judge-Orders-Dow-to-Explain-Shielding-of-Subsidiary-
in-Bhopal-Criminal-Case (discussing Union Carbide’s Bhopal disaster and the 
corporate responsibility issues involved); Andrew Gumbel, Tale of Rape and Murder 
on Burmese Pipeline Haunts U.S., THE INDEPENDENT (Dec. 11 2003), 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/tale-of-rape-and-murder-on-burm 
ese-pipeline-haunts-us-57624 8.html (discussing Unocal); Sheraz Sadiq, Timeline: 
Cochabamba Water Revolt, PUBLIC BROADCASTING SYS. (June 2002), http://www.pbs. 
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framework under international law that imposes liability for TNCs in 
these situations. 
Finding a theory of liability to hold TNCs accountable under 
international law is problematic. First, since many human rights 
violations occur in weak or nonfunctioning governance systems, 
attempts to use national laws to hold TNCs accountable for their role in 
human rights abuses has been largely unworkable.21 Second, any attempt 
to hold TNCs accountable at an international level is stymied by the 
underlying framework of international human rights law (namely as an 
accountability mechanism that was crafted by, and applied exclusively 
to, state actors).22 Third, attempts to try a transnational approach to 
accountability, while finding some limited success, are often barred by 
jurisdictional issues.23 Fourth (and relatedly), the peculiar legal structure 
of corporations, with their capacity to limit liability through subsidiaries, 
provides a difficult, often insurmountable burden in trying to assess 
what role these enterprises and their representatives have in the vast 
number of human rights abuses that occur. Finally, TNCs often use 
bystander rhetoric to distance themselves from underlying human rights 
violations, placing the blame on the State or the community.24 
Moreover, TNCs also employ other means of escaping liability 
through their use of, what I have labeled, bystander rhetoric. Rarely do 
TNCs disavow the existence of an event; rather, they take the position 
that they are mere bystanders—witnesses to the underlying event that 
have abstained from participation.25 This rhetoric is significant because, 
under most legal theories, bystanders cannot be held liable for the acts in 
question.26 Apart from the question of legal complicity, the rhetoric is 
also significant because it shows an attempt to convey the idea of the 
innocent bystander—an entity who, in essence, is often made to witness 
(against its will) the struggle between the aggressor and his victim.27 By 
                                                                                                                 
org/frontlineworld/stories/bolivia/timeline.html (documenting the water riots in Bolivia 
and including statement by a Bechtel spokeswoman suggesting that “the political 
instability in Bolivia, rather than people’s ire at water-rate hikes, was responsible for 
the ‘civil unrest.’”). 
 21. Respect Framework, supra note 13. 
 22. Martin Amerson, supra note 10, at 2. 
 23. Respect Framework, supra note 13, at ¶¶ 88–89. 
 24. Martin Amerson, supra note 10. 
 25. Martin Amerson, supra note 10, at 5. 
 26. Id. at 15. 
 27. Id. at 5. 
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employing this rhetoric, both as a public relations strategy and a 
litigation strategy, TNCs can escape liability under most national and 
international systems.28 
A. THE BYSTANDER RHETORIC 
TNCs and their corporate structures carry unique characteristics 
that make holding them liable difficult. First, TNCs are often 
specifically organized in such a way as to avoid liability for events that 
occur in different States.29 For instance, many TNCs, while 
organizationally seamless, are separate legal entities.30 Therefore, 
although a TNC may present one face to the global community, it is 
usually a collection of distinct legal entities. Its subsidiaries (which may 
be positioned on the ground during the abuses) are often organized 
under the laws of a Host State,31 while reporting directly to the 
executives of the parent corporation (domiciled in a different 
jurisdiction). As such, TNCs (and particularly the organizing parent 
corporation) are able to avoid liability for human rights abuses in the 
parent corporation’s jurisdiction by emphasizing the separate legal status 
of the entity in the Host State.32 
Second, TNCs wield an unusually large amount of wealth and 
power that oftentimes dwarfs the income and capacity of the Host 
State.33 Therefore, Host States that are dependent on TNCs for economic 
growth and development frequently turn the other way, or worse, 
                                                                                                                 
 28. Id. at 34–44. 
 29. Mahmood Mashiouri, Multinational Corporations and the Ethics of Global 
Responsibility: Problems and Possibilities, 25 HUM. RTS. Q. 965, 974 (2003). 
 30. For an expansive analysis of the legal personalities of TNCs, including when 
their separate legal personalities can be overcome, see Binda Sahni, The Interpretation 
of the Corporate Personality of Transnational Corporations, 15 WIDENER L.J. 1 (2005). 
 31. Under international law, the Home State is the State where the TNC’s primary 
headquarters are located. In contrast, the Host State is the locale of the operations that 
lead to human rights abuses. 
 32. See Sahni, supra note 30, at 34 (2005). Sahni explores how current corporate 
law allows a corporation to limit its own liability for its subsidiaries, whereby “[a 
TNC’s] ability to limit its owner’s liability makes the undertaking of otherwise risky 
projects more acceptable, thereby accelerating economic activity and development.” Id. 
 33. Martin Amerson, supra note 10, at 8 n.31; Mashiouri, supra note 29, at 973. 
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become complicit in human rights abuses to ensure that the TNCs will 
continue to remain.34 
Third, TNCs often embrace bystander rhetoric in the wake of 
human rights abuses. In essence, a TNC will claim that no overt act that 
led to the human rights abuse can be directly linked back to the TNC. As 
a result, the TNC will argue that it was merely a witness, a bystander to 
the underlying acts that occurred. Corporate actors will frequently 
acknowledge that there are human rights abuses occurring around them, 
but will disclaim any and all involvement with the acts, frustrating 
efforts to hold them accountable. 
Despite the TNC’s rhetoric, many accountability mechanisms have 
been proposed35 and attempted36 to address the unique position of TNCs. 
By and large, these have focused on the actions of a TNC in relation to 
an underlying event. For instance, most litigation that has been launched 
against TNCs has attempted to ascribe some action to the TNC that led 
to the human rights abuse in question.37 Nevertheless, TNCs uniformly 
                                                                                                                 
 34. See Interim Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on 
the Issue of Hum. Rts. and Transnat’l Corp. and Other Bus. Enter., Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights, Comm’n on Hum. Rts., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/97 (Feb. 
22, 2006), available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G06/110/27/PD 
F/G0611027.pdf?OpenElement [hereinafter 2006 Interim Report]. 
[Yet a] third rationale for engaging the transnational corporate sector has emerged in 
the past few years: the sheer fact that it has global reach and capacity, and that it is 
capable of acting at a pace and scale that neither Governments nor international 
agencies can match. Other social actors increasingly are looking for ways to leverage 
this platform in order to cope with pressing societal problems - often because 
Governments are unable or unwilling to perform their functions adequately. 
Id. ¶ 16. 
 35. See, e.g., Jennifer Rubenstein, Accountability in an Unequal World, 69 J. POL. 
616 (2007) (proposing a model of surrogate accountability for holding powerful actors 
responsible on the international stage). 
 36. In the United States, the proposed mechanism of choice was the Alien Tort 
Claims Act (“ATCA”). For a current view of the legal landscape surrounding ATCA, 
see Janine Stansinz, Note, The Expansion of Limited Liability Protection in the 
Corporate Form: The Aftermath of Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 5 BROOK. J. 
CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 573 (2011). 
 37. One example is Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 573 F. Supp. 2d 16, 23 (D.D.C. 
2008), a case brought by Indonesian villagers and their next of kin who alleged that 
soldiers who were employed by Exxon to maintain order for their pipeline brutalized 
and tortured the villagers. Another example is the case of Ken Wiwa, an activist 
executed by the Nigerian government for making claims that it, along with Shell, 
destroyed the environment and reaped profits. For an analysis of Shell’s involvement in 
Wiwa’s trial, see Martin Amerson, supra note 10, at 24-27. 
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deny their involvement in such underlying events. Given the weak legal 
framework for extraterritorial violations, plaintiffs who sue, particularly 
in the United States, are not often successful.38 
This is why the debate has often stalled: rather than focusing on 
corporations as the responsible actors, current international law 
mechanisms focus on the state as the actor, and corporations as mere 
bystanders—but there is no legal framework that addresses the 
complicity of such witnesses.39 Moreover, TNCs have taken advantage 
                                                                                                                 
 38. See generally Martin Amerson, supra note 10, at 23-31; see also Ronen 
Shamir, Between Self-Regulation and the Alien Tort Claims Act: On the Contested 
Concept of Corporate Social Responsibility, 38 LAW AND SOC’Y REV. 635, 655 (2004) 
(“[TNC]s thus depict themselves as both lacking an ability to have an impact on 
relevant policies and neutrally respectful of state policies in the countries where they 
operate.”). Shamir uses the examples of Coca-Cola in Indonesia and Unocal in Burma. 
Both corporations made defenses that they were too far removed from the situation to 
have any influence over the human rights abuses that occurred. Id. at 650. Shamir also 
analyzes the weaknesses of the ATCA, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, as a mechanism to sue TNCs 
for human rights abuses. Id. at 650-655. The defenses, combined with a weak doctrine, 
makes litigation an uphill battle for plaintiffs. Id. at 659-660. 
 39. Id. at 32. Complicity theory is one legal tactic that seeks to avoid the 
conundrum that exists when the alleged action is far removed from the prosecuted 
actor. In one respect, complicity is an attractive alternative—unlike many other theories 
of liability, it can be used with some underlying legal accountability mechanism in the 
international arena. The key shortcoming for complicity under international law as it 
stands now, is that it does not go far enough. For instance, the current consensus 
regarding complicity and international law is that “mere presence where an abuse 
occurs, or deriving incidental benefit from a relationship with one who commits an 
abuse or even from the abuse itself, is unlikely to result in legal liability for 
complicity.” See U.N. Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Bus. and Hum. 
Rts., Letter dated Sept. 12, 2008 from the Special Representative to the Legal Officer of 
Int’l Econ. Rel. of the Int’l Comm’n of Jurists (Sept. 12, 2008), available at http://www 
.reports-and-materials.org/Ruggie-comments-ICJ-complicity-report-12-Sep-2008.pdf 
(summarizing the current criminal framework for complicity). 
  While it bears many similarities to the idea of complicity, the bystander 
concept is not the same. The standard for complicity that is widely accepted as the most 
clear articulation of international law is found in a United States Court of Appeals case, 
Doe v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002). At its core, complicity behavior is 
based, at least in part, on some overt act on the part of the actor that leads to 
“substantial assistance.” Id. at 951. In contrast, bystander liability, rather than being 
based on the actions of the TNC, is based on the relationship that the TNC has with the 
host country. As a result, bystander liability is arguably most appropriate in situations 
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of this legal structure by reinforcing, through their legal and nonlegal 
strategies, the claim that they only witnessed but did not participate in 
the underlying events. 
Invoking a bystander strategy takes a new approach. Rather than 
focusing on the conduct of TNCs, it accepts TNCs as mere bystanders, 
using this rhetoric as a starting point for an accountability mechanism. A 
key characteristic then of any accountability structure built around this 
strategy marks a shift in focus from the actions of TNCs to the special 
relationships that TNCs have created (particularly in weak governance 
zones), and further, how those relationships may create special duties for 
TNCs under international law. 
Sometimes these duties have been recognized in the legal system, 
albeit in extralegal ways (i.e., under principles of equity rather than 
precedent). One example is Union Carbide’s involvement with an 
explosion at a plant in Bhopal, India. 
B. INDIA’S BHOPAL DISASTER 
Union Carbide has had a long history of operating in India.40 On 
December 2, 1984, its facility, located in Bhopal, India, had an accident 
during which deadly gas emitted from the factory and out into the 
community. While the figures vary regarding the number of deaths that 
resulted, the most conservative estimates place the death toll at 400 from 
that evening alone.41 In subsequent months, the death toll would rise to 
15,000.42 Since then, due to the continuing contamination of the area, as 
well as its groundwater and soil, illness and deaths relating to that 
                                                                                                                 
where the relationship is at issue because of the duties that arise from the recognition of 
special relationships. See Martin Amerson, supra note 10, at 12. 
 40.  Internat’l Confed. of Free Trade Unions & Internat’l Fed. of Chemical, 
Energy, and General Workers Unions, The Report of the ICFTU-ICEF Mission to Study 
the Causes and Effects of the Methyl Isocyanate Gas Leak at the Union Carbide 
Pesticide Plant in Bhopal, India, on December 2nd/3rd 1984, BHOPAL.NET, http://www 
.bhopal.net/oldsite/documentlibrary/unionreport1985.html (last visited October 31, 
2012). 
 41. There is also a wide range of estimates regarding the number of people who 
died in the days after the disaster, however, by all accounts, the numbers multiplied 
rapidly so that within the first seventy-two hours more than 1,200 were likely dead. The 
Bhopal Disaster, CENTER FOR SCIENCE AND ENVIRONMENT, http://www.cseindia.org/us 
erfiles/THE%20BHOPAL%20DISASTER.pdf. 
 42. Rallies Held over Bhopal Disaster, BBC NEWS (Dec. 3, 2004), available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4064527.stm. 
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evening still occur.43 At the time of the accident, Union Carbide (now 
owned by Dow Chemical) was the parent company of Union Carbide 
India (“UCI”). The company had a 50.9% interest in UCI, sufficient to 
exercise control over the subsidiary.44 
Within a week of the accident, lawsuits were filed in the U.S. 
against Union Carbide, the parent corporation. The company defended 
on the grounds of forum non conveniens.45 The U.S. District Court for 
the Southern District of New York, which had consolidated all of the 
suits into one lawsuit and one jurisdiction, agreed to dismiss the suit 
against Union Carbide if the company would consent to jurisdiction in 
India.46 Once the suit was removed to India, the litigation continued. In 
1989, the company made a settlement offer of $470M.47 The Indian 
Supreme Court subsequently approved the settlement amount.48 
Although Union Carbide argued that it should not be held 
responsible because it did not have control over the actions of its 
subsidiary, the Indian Supreme Court soundly rejected this principle. 
The Court held that because Union Carbide was the majority 
shareholder in its Indian subsidiary, it had the power to exercise “full 
control” over UCI and its board.49 Even if it did not exercise that power, 
as Union Carbide alleged, that policy “could not absolve it from its 
liability.”50 In this ruling the court, although not explicitly, turned the 
bystander strategy invoked by Union Carbide on its head and found that 
                                                                                                                 
 43. Id. 
 44. Under Indian law, foreign direct investment is normally limited to 40%. 
Practising Law Institute, 765 Commercial Law & Practice Course Handbook Series 
International Joint Ventures 141, 155 (Mar. 1998). However, Union Carbide was 
granted an exemption. Gas Leak Shatter Reputation, LAWRENCE-JOURNAL WORLD 
(Dec. 16. 1984) available at http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=219&dat=198412 
16&id=83EzAAAAIBAJ&sjid=DOkFAAAAIBAJ&pg=4436,3913765. 
 45. In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal India in December, 
1984, 634 F.Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986). 
 46. Id. at 867. 
 47. Union Carbide v. Union of India et. al., (2/14/1989) (Supreme Court of India), 
available at http://judis.nic.in. 
 48. Id. 
 49. VAGTS ET AL., TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS PROBLEMS 195-196 (4th ed.). 
 50. Id. 
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the sheer nature of the accident, along with principles of equity, made 
the company liable (if not solely liable) for the disaster.51 
This case highlights the use of bystander rhetoric well. Union 
Carbide’s seemingly attenuated legal status from its subsidiary led the 
corporation to argue that it should not be held accountable for the 
disaster at Bhopal. The company could not (and did not) deny that the 
accident occurred; rather, it simply stated that its legal status as a U.S. 
corporation made it, in essence, a distant bystander to the event that 
occurred half a world away. 
C. IMPLEMENTING A BYSTANDER THEORY 
As of right now, the bystander strategy is in its formative stages. 
Although unusual in case law, the idea of holding a party responsible for 
their inaction is not without precedent.52 For instance, in certain limited 
situations in American tort law, nonfeasance can result in legal 
accountability and legal liability. In those situations, the relationship 
between the bystander and the victim creates a special duty which can 
then lead to liability for the duty bearer’s inaction.53 Likewise, a 
contemplated bystander analysis for legal liability under international 
law might begin by analyzing relationships under this type of 
framework—one that will allow relationships to give rise to a duty that 
in turn forms the foundation for a theory of accountability.54 To do 
                                                                                                                 
 51. Union Carbide v. Union of India (Madhya Pradesh H.C.) No. 26/88 (1988), 
reprinted in VAGTS ET AL., supra note 49. 
 52. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty., 489 U.S. 189 (1989); Kim Boyer, 
Comment, County Welfare Department Liability for Handling Reports of Child Abuse, 
30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 187, 190–191 (1993). 
 53. The case of DeShaney v. Winnebago County, 489 U.S. 189 (1989), provides a 
discussion of a special relationship and how a special relationship (in this case between 
the State and the victim) can create a duty to act. In DeShaney, a young boy was beaten 
extensively by his father over the course of many years. Id. at 192. During that time, the 
State had substantial evidence that abuse was occurring and yet did not step in to stop it. 
Id. at 192–93. As a result of the beatings, DeShaney suffered extensive brain damage. 
Id. at 193. In a 6-3 ruling, the Court held that the State had no duty to act. Id. at 200–02. 
However, the court noted that in certain instances, where a special relationship is 
created, it may give rise to a constitutional duty to act. Id. at 201–02. The Court also 
discussed whether a duty may be created under state tort law. Id. 
 54. In American case law, it is the relationship between the bystander and the 
victim that creates the duty to act. For an overview of the case law on the subject, see 
Boyer, supra note 52, at 190–91. Given that TNCs are often present in weak 
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otherwise would make the parameters of inaction too large and unwieldy 
for a serious structure of accountability. 
The bystander framework, as articulated, also has room for 
flexibility. The American theory of nonfeasance happens to be one of 
the most promising areas where the bystander theory can grow, but there 
are many different jurisprudential theories that can be used to craft a 
workable framework for TNCs under international law. Unjust 
enrichment,55 which has traditionally been categorized under theories of 
contract but is much more accurately a theory of equity, is another. 
Moreover, an additional theory of accountability may stem from a 
theory of products liability. Under a products liability theory, a 
corporation assumes liability for the status of its product regardless of its 
final market.56 So, for instance, a Taiwanese manufacturer can still face 
liability if it improperly manufactures a fire extinguisher that results in 
deaths and injuries in California. One can ask why the same result 
should not occur in a human rights framework. As one author notes: “If 
companies legally assume responsibility for the quality of their products 
regardless of where they are manufactured, should they not also bear 
some responsibility for the manner and conditions in which they are 
produced?”57 All of these theories are an attempt to solve the problem 
that has occurred as a result of the rapidly evolving role of business 
within the world.  
In his 2008 Report, Ruggie argues that the single greatest challenge 
to crafting a business and human rights regime stems from the rise of 
                                                                                                                 
governance zones, an appropriate accountability theory for business and human rights 
violations might focus on the relationship between the TNC and the aggressor, in lieu of 
or in addition to, the relationship between the TNC and the victim.  
 55. M.C.D., Annotation, Nontort Liability of Third Person Who Receives Money or 
Property in Supposed Performance of Contract, to Party to Contract Who Was Entitled 
Thereto, 106 A.L.R. 322 (1937). 
 56. For a geographically close example, see In re Ephedra Products Liability 
Litigation, 349 B.R. 333 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006) (addressing enforcement of a 
Canadian court’s bankruptcy order for a Canadian company’s involvement in marketing 
ephedra). 
 57. Justine Nolan, Global Scourge of Corporate Buck-Passing on Workers’ Rights, 
NATIONAL TIMES, June 10, 2010, http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/society-and-culture/ 
global-scourge-of-corporate-buckpassing-on-workers-rights-20100609-xwl9.html#ixz 
z1TEOTnOVy. 
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globalization.58 Specifically, Ruggie argues that globalization, and with 
it the rise of TNCs that are subject to the laws of many jurisdictions, has 
created a governance gap that international law has not yet filled.59 I 
agree with Ruggie’s assessment and suggest further that this gap is 
precisely the area in which the bystander framework applies. 
The bystander framework offers a mechanism whereby companies 
must take proactive steps to make sure that the relationships they are 
developing do not lead to violations of human rights law or ignore the 
consequences of those relationships at their peril.60  
II. OUT OF THE FIERY FURNACE: A REVIEW OF THE HISTORY OF 
BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS ON THE U.N. STAGE 
The issue of business and human rights has been on the 
international legal terrain for less than two decades.61 Its genesis came 
                                                                                                                 
 58. Respect Framework, supra note 13, ¶ 3. 
 59. The Respect Framework states that the governance gap can affect all 
corporations. Id. ¶ 17. However, it specifically uses TNCs as an example of the 
governance gap. Id. ¶ 3. 
 60. Indeed, this idea is a looming specter for many TNCs. See Memorandum 
Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz on A U.N. Proposal Defining Corp. Soc. Resp. for 
Hum. Rts. (May 1, 2008), available at http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/files/ 
wachtell_lipton_memo_on_global_business_human_rights.pdf (stating that Ruggie’s 
proposed framework would “impose on corporations the obligation to compensate for 
the political, civil, economic, social or other deficiencies of the countries in which they 
do business.”). 
 61. It is always difficult to set specific, temporal parameters when a movement 
emerges or becomes part of the national or international discourse. The issue of 
business and human rights is no exception. At least one source has identified the 
evolution as spanning three distinct phases. In the first phase, 1998–2002, mainly 
European and North American NGOs were pushing companies on their policies. The 
second phase, 2003–2006, was also led in North America and Europe, but shifted its 
focus to the conduct and impacts of corporations. The third phase, 2007-present, has 
emerged as a global debate that focuses mainly on “conduct on the ground.” Business & 
Human Rights, BUSINESS & HUMAN RIGHTS RESOURCE CENTRE, http://www.business-
humanrights.org/GettingStartedPortal/Intro (last visited Feb. 11, 2012). In contrast, at 
least one author traces the U.N.’s involvement in corporate accountability issues (if not 
specifically human rights issues) much further back. Connie De La Vega, Amol Mehra, 
& Alexander Wong, Holding Businesses Accountable for Human Rights Violations: 
Recent Developments and Next Steps, Dialogue on Globalization, 2 (July 2011), 
http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/08264.pdf (tracing the issue to 1972 when the U.N. 
Economic and Social Council commissioned a study on “the role of transnational 
corporations and their impact on the development process as well as on international 
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from a grassroots strategy developed by human rights advocates who 
were growing frustrated by the lack of accountability measures for 
TNCs and other multi-business enterprises. The popular sentiment was 
that TNCs seemed to be involved in or witness to many of the human 
rights disasters that were taking shape. Yet, by and large, there was no 
redress available—TNCs seemed to conduct their business with 
impunity. 
Since that time, the issue of business and human rights has begun to 
attract an enormous amount of attention.62 However, as mentioned 
earlier, finding a theory of liability to hold TNCs accountable under 
international law has been met with a myriad of problems. In addition, 
many TNCs employ the strategy of distancing themselves from 
underlying human rights violations, instead placing blame on the State 
or the community. For a long time, this was an effective legal strategy.63 
Nevertheless, TNCs did not escape exposure completely. In the court of 
public opinion, TNCs were losing.64 Realizing that the use of legal 
                                                                                                                 
relations.”). Nevertheless, a case study of one human rights organization’s publicity 
campaign shows the evolution. A survey of all Human Rights Watch press releases in 
the 1990s shows that the first press release explicitly discussing TNCs in connection 
with human rights campaigns occurred on Dec. 28, 1998. International Corporations 
Violate Women’s Rights in Mexico, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Dec. 29, 1998, 
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/1998/12/28/international-corporations-violate-womens-ri 
ghts-mexico. From 1998–2011, there is a slow but steady increase in press releases 
linking TNCs to human rights issues. See infra Appendix B. 
 62. 2006 Interim Report, supra note 34. 
There being no global repository of comprehensive, consistent, and impartial 
information, we cannot say with certainty whether abuses in relation to the corporate 
sector are increasing or decreasing over time, only that they are reported more 
extensively because more actors track them and transparency is greater than in the 
past. Of course, to victims of abuses this uncertainty matters little. But it does make it 
more difficult to design and assess the efficacy of alternative policy approaches to 
deal with these challenges – a bit like searching for ways to prevent and cure cancer 
without fully knowing its epidemiology. 
Id. ¶ 20. 
 63. Martin Amerson, supra note 10. 
 64. Cf. Respect Framework, supra note 13, at ¶ 54 (discussing the effect of 
companies who fail to take responsibility for human rights issues in the “courts of 
public opinion”). In addition, although at the time of this writing TNCs have not yet 
been subject to an unfavorable verdict for international human rights claims (i.e., under  
ATCA), there are nonetheless costs in litigating and even settling these issues. See 
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instruments was ineffective, many human rights advocates switched to 
publicity campaigns (frequently called “naming and shaming”) to 
highlight human rights abuses and force TNCs to change their 
behavior.65 
Businesses’ initial resistance to such strategies—and indeed the 
wider agenda of corporate social responsibility (“CSR”)—seems to have 
stemmed from the notion that corporations viewed business and human 
rights as a zero-sum game. Every move that a corporation made in the 
arena of a social cause was thought to take away from the raison d’être 
of a corporation—profit maximization.66 Indeed, noted business author 
Steve Forbes expressed his views on the CSR movement in this way: 
Under the label of Corporate Social Responsibility, firms are to take 
on a non-wealth-producing agenda of goals; profits will be lowered 
to safeguard labor rights, human health, civil liberties, environmental 
quality, sexual equality, and social justice. The fact that the 
corporation already plays its most effective role in these areas by 
profit maximization is little understood by CSR advocates.67 
Moreover, whether public relations and advocacy strategies were 
successful on a micro level seems impossible to prove. While some 
campaigns resulted in changed behavior,68 many did not. For instance, a 
                                                                                                                 
David Kinley et al., The Norms as Dead! Long Live the Norms! The Politics behind the 
United Nations Norms for Corporations, in THE NEW CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY: 
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LAW 468 (2007). 
 65. Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Sticks and Stones: Naming and Shaming the Human 
Rights Enforcement Problem, 62 INT’L ORG. 689 (2008) (examining specifically, 
statistics regarding governments as perpetrators, but the term can be applied to any 
human rights violator); Deborah Spar, The Spotlight and the Bottom Line: How 
Multinationals Export Human Rights, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Mar-Apr. 1998 (using the 
term “the spotlight phenomenon” in an examination of how corporations change their 
behavior when there is a heightened public awareness of human rights). 
 66. See Steve Forbes, Foreward as cited in DAVID HENDERSON, THE ROLE OF 
BUSINESS IN THE MODERN WORLD: PROGRESS, PRESSURES, AND PROSPECTS FOR THE 
MODERN ECONOMY ( 2004), available at http://cei.org/sites/default/files/David%20H 
enderson%20%20The%20Role%20of%20Business%20in%20the%20Modern%20Worl
d%20Progress,%20Pressures%20and%20Prospects%20for%20the%20Market%20Econ
omy.pdf. 
 67. See id. at 10. 
 68. Tim Bartley & Curtis Child, Shaming the Corporation: Globalization, 
Reputation and the Dynamics of Anti-Corporate Movements, http://www.indiana.edu/~ 
tbsoc/SM-corps-sub.pdf (arguing that publicly linking actors to systematic problems is 
an important part of social movements). 
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TNC could take advantage of a dwindling global attention span by 
simply waiting for a new corporate scandal to emerge, rather than taking 
steps to change their behavior.69 At the very least, the work of human 
rights advocates did find success in bringing TNCs’ behavior during 
human rights calamities into public discourse70 and, in doing so, set the 
stage for the U.N. Global Compact and its success. 
A. The U.N. Global Compact 
The U.N. Global Compact (the “Global Compact” or “Compact”) 
was launched in 2000 as a voluntary initiative to get businesses to 
engage in a wide-ranging societal agenda.71 At its heart, the Compact 
encourages businesses to pledge to honor ten principles that surround 
human rights issues.72 In return, the Compact allows businesses to 
become signatories. In the first year of its existence, the Compact had 
fifty signatories. As of this writing, the Compact has over 6,000.73 
The Compact came out of a challenge that Kofi Annan made to 
world business leaders during a speech at the World Economic Forum 
on January 31, 1999.74 At the time, the proposal was called “unusual” 
because it involved a formal compact between the United Nations and 
                                                                                                                 
 69. Id. at 23. 
 70. Bartley & Child, supra note 68. 
 71. About Us, THE UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT, http://www.unGlobalcomp 
act.org/AboutTheGC/index.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2012) [hereinafter U.N. GLOBAL 
COMPACT]. 
 72. Unlike many of the initiatives that came after this, the Global Compact 
originally began as an initiative from then Secretary-General Kofi-Annan. During an 
economic meeting in Switzerland, Kofi Annan gave a speech in which he discussed a 
global compact between the U.N. and businesses that would encourage businesses to 
infuse their companies with the values of human rights norms. See supra note 74 and 
accompanying text. 
 73. Participants & Stakeholders: U.N. Global Compact Participants, THE UNITED 
NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/ParticipantsAndStakeho 
lders/index.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2012). 
 74. U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s Address to World Economic Forum in 
Davos (Feb. 1, 1999), available at http://www.un.org/News/ossg/sg/stories/statments_ 
search_full.asp?statID=22 [hereinafter Address in Davos]. 
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business entities.75 Moreover, the Compact allows its signatories to 
shroud themselves in the legitimacy of the United Nations.76  
Annan emphasized that the Compact would be voluntary but 
warned of a backlash against the global markets if businesses did not 
take more proactive steps to ensure that they were addressing human 
rights abuses within their sphere of influence.77 In Annan’s words, the 
aim of the Compact was to “ensure that the global market is embedded 
in broadly shared values and practices which reflect global social needs, 
and that all the world’s people share the benefits of globalization.”78 As 
part of the Compact, business leaders agreed to do three things: (1) 
become public voices of the Compact by embedding the principles of 
the Compact into the company’s organizational structure (such as its 
mission statements and annual reports); (2) annually report on the 
company’s progress (or lack thereof) “of putting the principles into 
practice;”79 and (3) engage in partnership projects with the U.N. on both 
an operational and a policy level.80 
The Global Compact marked a strategic shift by the United 
Nations. Only a few years prior, the organization’s position was strongly 
against transnational firms, drafting summaries that documented their 
abuses.81 Its prior position reflected a deep suspicion that TNCs had 
                                                                                                                 
 75. Alan Cowell, Annan Fears Backlash over Global Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Feb 1, 
1999, at A14. 
 76. Specifically, companies who signed onto the Compact would have limited use 
of the U.N.’s logo in their corporate materials. 
 77. Cowell, supra note 75. While Annan presented the initiative as one that would 
benefit businesses, there is some indication that the Compact also benefited the United 
Nations. Some have noted that Annan’s term as the head of the United Nations marked 
a move away from irrelevance that had been plaguing the organization in previous 
years. See Callie Kramer, Kofi Annan and the United Nations win the 2001 Nobel 
Peace Prize, 18 N.Y.L SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 475 (2002) (noting that “Kofi Annan was also 
lauded for . . . revitalizing the 56 year-old United Nations.”). Cf. Joseph Kahn, 
Multinational Sign Pact on Rights and Environment, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 27, 2000, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/07/27/world/multinationals-sign-un-pact-on-rights-and-
environment.html?pagewanted=all (stating that the Global Compact “is an attempt by 
Mr. Annan to make the world body a more effective force for labor and social 
standards”). 
 78. Kofi Annan, A Deal with Business to Support Universal Values, INT’L HERALD 
TRIB., July 26, 2000, at 8. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Editorial, Taming Globalization, WASH. POST, Aug. 7, 2000, at A20 
[hereinafter Taming Globalization]. 
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nothing positive to offer the world’s communities. In contrast, Annan’s 
speech marked a new consensus view in the organization that 
globalization was “the only remotely viable means of pulling billions of 
people out of the abject poverty in which they find themselves.”82 TNCs 
became recognized as pioneering the shift toward globalization, taking 
part in the solution, not just the problem.83 
Interestingly, Ruggie was one of the main architects and strong 
defenders of the Global Compact.84 As U.N. Assistant Secretary-General 
from 1997 to 2001, Ruggie responded to critics who believed that the 
Global Compact would simply provide companies with an easy 
whitewash of their image. Specifically, Ruggie stated: 
You quote critics who assert that the secretary general’s “global 
compact,” designed to identify and promote good corporate practices 
in human rights, labor standards and the environment, opens the 
United Nations’ doors to big business. These critics ignore the fact 
that the Compact is an equal partnership among business, 
international labor and global nongovernmental organizations. The 
                                                                                                                 
 82. Id. (quoting an unnamed agency representative). 
 83. Many argue that the evolution of globalization has its roots in the post-Cold 
War world. Businesses, freed from the dominant political stratification between the East 
and the West, were able to tap into emerging markets in a way that previously would 
have been impossible. In fact, one author credits the end of the Cold War with the shift 
in focus towards advocacy of multinationals. Alan Cowell, Advocates Gain Ground in a 
Globalized Era, N.Y. TIMES, DEC. 18, 2000, at C19. In a discussion of the human rights 
advocacy strategy that emerged in the late 1990s with DeBeers and its mining of 
conflict diamonds, Cowell wrote: 
The campaign and its fruits, though, go beyond diamonds, because they reinforce one 
of the most striking effects of the globalization that has been under way since the end 
of the cold war. Increasingly, with multinational corporations gathering unparalleled 
power as the standard-bearers of freewheeling capitalism—in many countries, more 
powerful than the governments themselves—they are being held to account by 
shoestring advocacy groups like Global Witness that have filled the vacuum created 
by the end of the ideological contest between East and West, between capitalism and 
socialism. 
Id. 
 84. Robert A. Senser, Big Business and the U.N.; Toward a New Framework for 
Corporate Responsibility, AM. CATH. WKLY., Dec. 1, 2008, available at 
http://www.americanmagazine.org/content/article.cfm?article_id=11253. Much of 
Ruggie’s later work as Special Rapporteur seems to be influenced by his work on the 
Global Compact. 
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United Nations has guidelines for dealing with business; they were 
adopted in July. 
You report that one critic suggested that the inclusion in the global 
compact of companies that may have had spotty records in the past 
sends the wrong signal. The implication is that the United Nations 
should strive to improve the performance only of the perfect. Doing 
so would make life easier, but what would be the point?85 
Although the Compact was praised in some sectors86 and seen as an 
important step forward in bringing businesses into the conversation 
regarding human rights,87 its shortcomings flowed alongside its 
popularity among businesses. Because it was voluntary, there were no 
consequences for deviating from these principles apart from the public 
disapprobation stirred by human rights advocates’ various shaming 
campaigns, which many regarded as ineffective.88 
Many international human rights groups, including groups who 
participated in the first Compact meeting, felt that self-regulation by 
                                                                                                                 
 85. John Ruggie, Letter to the Editor, Re ‘Globalization Tops 3-Day U.N. Agenda 
for World Leaders’ (front page, Sept. 3), N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2000, at A30. Ruggie’s 
initial position prior to becoming the Special Representative may have been one reason 
why people criticized him for his subsequent work on the Framework. 
 86. Victoria Brittain, Business Rallies to U.N. Ethics Scheme, THE GUARDIAN, July 
26, 2000, at 12; Maria Livanos Cattaui, Yes to Annan’s ‘Global Compact’ if It Isn’t a 
License to Meddle, INT’L HERALD TRIB., July 26, 2000, at 8; Mark Moody-Stuart 
Welcomes the New Global Compact Between the U.N. and Business, ECONOMIC NEWS, 
July 27, 2000; Marketplace: Making Corporations Good, Global Citizens, NAT’L PUB. 
RADIO, Sept. 6, 2000; Michael Oliver, Global Governance and Civil Society, PEACE 
MAG., January 2000, at v.16(1). 
 87. Of course, the Compact also had its critics right from the beginning. See, e.g., 
Joshua Karliner & Kenny Bruno, Opinion, The United Nations Sits in Suspicious 
Company, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Aug. 6, 2000, at 6 (stating that the self-regulation 
process of the Global Compact “threatens the integrity of the U.N.”). For a middle 
ground response, see Taming Globalization, supra note 81 (stating that while the 
Global Compact allowed corporations to have “cheap halos,” the author concludes that 
“the idea of partnering with the private sector beats merely denouncing it”). 
 88. Other initiatives that were used during this era include: The Sullivan Principles 
(voluntary codes of conduct adopted by businesses on issues that affect broader society) 
and the OECD and its Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (State recommendations 
to businesses regarding standards of conduct). While these initiatives have some 
relevance to the international legal framework on business and human rights (not least 
of which is the offering of a soft law foundation for future accountability mechanisms), 
this Article focuses on various mandates that have come from the United Nations within 
the last eight years. 
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businesses under the Compact was insufficient. Pierre Sane, then 
Secretary General of Amnesty International, stated that in order for the 
Compact to be “‘effective and credible’ there must be publicly reported 
independent monitoring and enforcement via a sanctions system ‘so 
companies who are violating these principles cannot continue to benefit 
from the partnership.’”89 
 In reality, there is little wonder that human rights advocates would 
seem frustrated by the Compact, given some of its vague and amorphous 
language. There are ten90 principles that are at the heart of the Global 
Compact, each involving how businesses engage in a wider social 
agenda within four specific spheres: human rights, labor, environmental 
impact, and corruption.91 Only two of the ten principles explicitly fall 
under the rubric of human rights: “(1) Businesses should support and 
respect the protection of internationally proclaimed human rights; and 
(2) make sure that they are not complicit in human rights abuses.”92 
Although many of the other principles are stated as labor issues, they in 
fact fall under the larger umbrella of human rights concerns.93 Indeed, 
on its face, the ambiguous nature of the Global Compact seems to leave 
little hope of developing a consistent framework for operationalizing94 
its principles.95  
                                                                                                                 
 89. Karliner & Bruno, supra note 87. 
 90. The Global Compact, as originally conceived, had nine principles. The tenth 
(dealing with anticorruption issues) was added in 2004 during the first Global Summit 
on the Compact. 
 91. About Us: The Ten Principles, THE UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT, 
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/index.html (last 
visited Feb. 11, 2012) [hereinafter Ten Principles]. 
 92. U.N. GLOBAL COMPACT, supra note 71. 
 93. See Ten Principles, supra note 91, (Principles 3–6: Labour). 
 94. In interviews regarding his mandate, Ruggie uses the term “operationalize” to 
describe what he was attempting to do with the Guiding Principles. As used by Ruggie, 
operationalization is the process by which theories and legal doctrines are turned into a 
workable Framework of policies and assessments that can then be implemented by 
various actors. For consistency, I adopt that term here. 
 95. In the wake of these criticisms, the Global Compact office created a Report 
entitled “After the Signature: A Guide to Engagement in the United Nations Global 
Compact.” UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT, AFTER THE SIGNATURE: A GUIDE TO 
ENGAGEMENT IN THE UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT (JAN. 2012), available at 
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/news_events/8.1/after_the_signature.pdf  
[hereinafter AFTER THE SIGNATURE].  
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Nevertheless, although the Compact’s foundational principles 
remain vague, the Global Compact office (set up in the wake of the 
program’s initiation) has taken steps to elaborate on some of these 
issues. For instance, one of the most significant developments made by 
the Global Compact is the introduction of the notion of sphere(s) of 
influence. The Compact defines sphere of influence as follows: 
Companies are asked to embrace, support and enact the ten 
principles within their “sphere of influence.” Perhaps the term is 
better described as spheres of influence, and envisioned as a series of 
concentric circles, where influence diminishes as the circles get 
bigger. The smallest circle includes a company’s core business 
activities in the workplace and marketplace. This is where a 
company has the greatest control in affecting ESG (environmental, 
social and governance) performance. The next circle covers the 
supply chain. Control is weakened here, but in some cases the 
influence can be significant. The third circle includes a company’s 
community interaction, social investment and philanthropy activities. 
And the final circle of influence is a company’s engagement in 
public policy dialogue and advocacy activities.96 
Through this type of elaboration of the concepts embodied in its 
principles, the Global Compact attempts to push TNCs towards a greater 
realization of human rights. Unfortunately, an outside mechanism or 
review to track whether the Compact’s goals are being achieved is still 
lacking. Thus,  a company can set up its own guidelines that might fall 
into the amorphous category of “respecting human rights” without 
actually engaging in the Compact the way the Global Compact Office 
suggests. Therefore, notwithstanding this failure to achieve the 
Compact’s goals, such businesses can conceivably continue to benefit 
from the imprimatur of the U.N. logo. 
Some scholars contend that the Compact is presently a soft law 
mechanism that may give rise to a more tangible accountability 
framework in the future. As Erika George states, “International law must 
come to [recognize] that there are multiple and heterogeneous sources of 
authority in pluralistic systems. . . . We should consider whether 
corporations are making law in making pledges. Is the Global Compact 
                                                                                                                 
Rather than relying on vague, amorphous language, Ruggie’s framework and 
Guiding Principles examine the issue of business and human rights with clear policy 
goals and operational steps to actualizing those goals. 
 96. Id. at 11. 
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a contract?”97 The Compact itself seeks to discourage the notion that it 
can be used as an accountability mechanism (either through breach of 
contract or otherwise). Indeed, the Compact was never intended as an 
operational framework; instead, the Compact’s follow-up literature 
makes clear that it is not a monitoring mechanism or even a standard of 
conduct.98 
As a result, the Global Compact (with its voluntary initiatives and  
unenforceable mechanisms) led many human rights advocates to the 
conclusion that what was really needed was an international legal 
instrument that would hold TNCs accountable.99 
                                                                                                                 
 97. Erika George, The Place of the Private Transnational Actor in International 
Law: Human Rights Norms, Development Aims and Understanding Corporate Self-
Regulation as Soft Law, 101 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 28 (2007). George contends that 
because the statements contained in the Global Compact are policy statements that are 
adopted by what she views as legitimate authority, the Global Compact can make the 
way towards future binding frameworks. Id. 
 98. AFTER THE SIGNATURE, supra note 95, at 7. 
 99. In their nascent stage, business and human rights issues appeared to be framed 
largely within the context of the corporate social responsibility debate, perhaps because 
an appropriate alternative dialogue on the issue of accountability mechanisms was 
lacking. In fact, at least in nonlegal academia, much of the literature written on 
corporate social responsibility before the 1990s framed it as a moral or ethical issue, 
rarely as implicating fundamental human rights. For a survey on this literature, see Sita 
C. Amba-Rao, Multinational Corporate Social Responsibility, Ethics, Interactions and 
Third World Governments: An Agenda for the 1990s, 12 J. BUS. ETHICS, no. 7, at 553–
572 (1993). 
  Now, however, it seems that the conversations have diverged. Therefore, each 
dialogue—that surrounding general corporate social responsibility issues and that 
involving business and human rights—should encompass its own sphere of scholarship. 
As Chris Avery, Director of the Business and Human Rights Centre, notes, 
“[s]ometimes the relationship between Corporate Social Responsibility (“CSR”) and 
human rights is not properly understood.” Avery elaborates: “A CSR approach tends to 
be top-down: a company decides what issues it wishes to address. . . . [b]ut a human 
rights approach is different. It is not top-down, but bottom-up—with the individual at 
the centre, not the corporation.” Chris Avery, Guest Editorial, The Difference Between 
CSR and Human Rights, CORP. CITIZENSHIP BRIEFING, Issue 89, Aug./Sept. 2006, 
available at http://www.reports-and-materials.org/Avery-difference-between-CSR-and-
human-rights-Aug-Sep-2006.pdf. 
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B. THE U.N. NORMS 
The U.N. Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Entities (“the Norms”)100 was one of 
the earliest documents to explicitly state that TNCs could be held liable 
under international law for human rights abuses.101 Drafted by the U.N. 
Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights 
(“Sub-Commission”) and drawing on numerous human rights treaties, 
                                                                                                                 
 100. Comm’n on Hum. Rts., Subcomm., 55th Sess., Norms on the Responsibilities 
of Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human 
Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (Aug. 13, 2003) [hereinafter Norms]. 
There is some debate in the academic community regarding whether previous treaties 
have implicitly drawn an accountability framework. For instance, the Norms 
themselves point to numerous treaties as the source of their authority. See discussion 
infra Part II.B.2. While certain treaties that bind TNCs deal with specific aspects of 
human rights (i.e., slavery and genocide), I am unaware of any other U.N. document 
that explicitly takes this approach towards human rights issues globally. As one author 
notes, the primary obstacle to the world community accepting that TNCs have a duty 
under international law to protect against human rights violations, “seems to be the fact 
that the U.N. human rights treaties are instruments of international law that bind 
ratifying States rather than non-State actors.” SILVIA DANAILOV, THE ACCOUNTABILITY 
OF NON-STATE ACTORS FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS: THE SPECIAL CASE OF 
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS 33 (Geneva 1998), available at http://www.lawand 
development.org/docs/transnationalcorps.pdf. 
 101. In his June 2009 Report to the Council, Ruggie states that the Human Rights 
Council’s endorsement of the Respect Framework “marked the first time the Council or 
its predecessor had taken a substantive policy position on business and human rights.” 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Business and Human Rights: Towards 
Operationalizing the “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, Hum. Rts. Council, 
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/11/13 (Apr. 22, 2009) (by John Ruggie), available at http://www2.o 
hchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/11session/A.HRC.11.13.pdf [hereinafter 2009 
Report]. Notably, this issue came up more broadly in the 1970s, in the wake of a 
scandal involving ITT’s alleged involvement in the overthrow of the Chilean 
government. In response, the U.N. created a commission to develop a code of conduct 
for TNCs.  The code was formulated but never adopted by the United Nations and was 
finally abandoned in 1992. While the document marked the first attempt to discuss 
TNC conduct in relation to human rights, it was not substantive in scope. Chris 
Jochnick & Nina Rabaeus, Business and Human Rights Revitalized: A New UN 
Framework Meets Texaco in the Amazon, 33 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 413, 415 
(2010). In addition, although the Sub-Commission did work on the Norms, they 
remained at this level and the then Commission on Human Rights never adopted them.  
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the Norms purportedly restated the guiding norms and principles at that 
time for holding TNCs accountable.102 
1. Textual Analysis 
The Norms embody the first attempt by the U.N. to set forth 
accountability mechanisms for TNCs under international human rights 
law.103 In addition, although they discuss the State’s duty to protect, the 
focus of responsibility is laid squarely at the feet of TNCs. In order to 
secure their influence,104 the Norms reference approximately thirty 
transnational instruments as the sources from which they derive their 
authority for TNCs and human rights issues.105 In one sense, the Norms 
                                                                                                                 
 102. Norms, supra note100, Preamble. See David Weissbrodt & Muria Kruger, 
Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business 
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, 97 AM. J. OF INT’L L. 901 (2003), at 901. 
 103. See Norms, supra note 100, for a more thorough discussion of the history of 
TNCs and human rights under international law. 
 104. Because the Norms were not “an international treaty open to ratification by 
States,” they would not be “legally binding” on either States or TNCs. Nevertheless, as 
a purported restatement of the law regarding TNCs and human rights abuses, if adopted, 
the Norms could have been a powerful accountability tool for human rights advocates 
and victims of human rights abuses. INT’L NETWORK ON FOR ECON., SOC. & CULTURAL 
RTS., U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS FOR BUSINESS: BRIEFING KIT 4 (Jan. 2005), 
available at http://www.escr-net.org/usr_doc/Briefing_Kit.pdf; see also discussion infra 
note 136 and accompanying text. 
 105. Among the diverse set of instruments referenced are the International Code of 
Marketing of Breast-milk Substitutes (adopted by the World Health Assembly) and the 
Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. Norms, supra note 100,      
¶ 2. There are a significant number of human rights treaties that can impact the 
intersection of business and human rights. In fact, one of Ruggie’s main contentions in 
drafting the Norms was that all human rights can be impacted and influenced by 
corporate activities. In fact, one of the goals of the U.N. Norms was to analyze all the 
“relevant” human rights treaties and decide which ones in particular would be within 
the sphere of influence for corporations. Ruggie’s work was in direct opposition to this 
approach. Instead, the Guiding Principles start from the premise that the “corporate 
responsibility to respect human rights applies to all internationally recognized human 
rights because business enterprises can have an impact – directly or indirectly – on 
virtually the entire spectrum of these rights.” U.N. HUMAN RTS. OFF. OF THE HIGH 
COMM’R, THE CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY TO RESPECT HUMAN RIGHTS, AN 
INTERPRETIVE GUIDE 13 (2012), available at http://www.ohchr.org/DocumentsPublicat 
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draw on their precedent documents, particularly the U.N. Global 
Compact. For instance, the Norms’ statement “noting that transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises have the capacity to foster 
economic well-being, development, technological improvement and 
wealth,” appear to echo Kofi Annan’s remarks that globalization 
through shared values between business and society can lead to an age 
of “global prosperity.”106 
At the core, however, the thrust of the Norms is to specifically 
devise a mechanism that holds TNCs accountable under international 
law for human rights violations.107 In that sense, the Norms are specific. 
While the Norms require TNCs to respect cultural and social rights 
generally,108 they focus mainly on issues that overtly implicate TNCs—
namely their role in targeted human rights abuses including workers’ 
rights, workplace discrimination, and consumer protection.109 
In addition to the specific subject matter that the Norms address, 
they also include two particularly controversial aspects: (1) the mandate 
for TNCs to implement the principles embodied in the Norms; and (2) a 
U.N. monitoring body to review the “application of the Norms.”110 
These provisions may reflect an attempt by the Sub-Commission to 
address critics’ concerns, whereas two of the strongest criticisms of the 
                                                                                                                 
ions/HR.PUB.12.2_En.pdf. 
 106. Address in Davos, supra note 74. 
 107. Indeed, one of Ruggie’s chief objections to the Norms is his claim that, while 
purporting to be a restatement of the law, they invoked a binding accountability 
framework for TNCs. See discussion infra at footnote 134 and accompanying text. 
 108. Norms, supra note 100, ¶ 10. 
 109. Id. ¶¶ 3–8. 
 110. Id. ¶ 16. Putting aside the spirit of the monitoring process, the language in the 
Norms regarding monitoring is problematic. What exactly should the U.N. monitor? 
How should TNCs apply the Norms to their internal mechanisms? How should 
particular Norms apply, at any given period in time, to a TNC? The Norms are silent as 
to these questions. Likewise, the Norms Commentary sheds no light on this subject. 
Rather, the Commentary simply states that the Council should “receive information and 
take effective action when enterprises fail to comply with the Norms.” Comm’n on 
Hum. Rts., Subcomm’n, Commentary on the Norms on the Responsibilities of 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human 
Rights, ¶ 16(b), U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/38/Rev.2 (Aug. 26, 2003), available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/e06a5300f90fa0238025668700518ca4/2 
93378ff2003ceb0c1256d7900310d90/$FILE/G0316018.pdf [hereinafter Norms 
Commentary]. 
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Global Compact were that it lacked an implementation procedure and a 
monitoring body.111 
In the Commentary accompanying the Norms, the Sub-Commission 
outlines a six-step process for making sure that TNCs implement these 
rules. They include: 
 
1) distributing their internal operational rules to all relevant 
stakeholders (including employees, trade unions, 
contractors, subcontractors and suppliers); 
2) providing training on the rules and how to implement them; 
3) only working with contractors who follow the Norms; 
4) increasing transparency “by disclosing timely, relevant, 
regular and reliable information regarding their activities, 
structure, financial situation and performance;” 
5) informing affected communities about its activities; and 
6) continually working on improving the Norms.112 
 
These implementation procedures place a heavy burden on TNCs to 
demonstrate how their activities either benefit or harm groups and 
communities in the area of human rights. Further, a TNC would need to 
integrate human rights issues into all aspects of its operations in order 
for an implementation program to be successful, rather than simply 
relegating the subject to its corporate social responsibility department. 
Moreover, the Norms took a bold step forward from previous U.N. 
documents by finding that an independent body should monitor and 
enforce TNCs’ implementation of these rules.113 In fact, the 
Commentary expands on this notion by arguing that a large and varied 
group of stakeholders should participate in the monitoring efforts. They 
                                                                                                                 
 111. KENNY BRUNO & JOSHUA KARLINER, TANGLED UP IN BLUE: CORPORATE 
PARTNERSHIPS AT THE UNITED NATIONS 7–9 (Transnat’l Res. & Action Ctr. Sept. 2000), 
available at http://s3.amazonaws.com/corpwatch.org/downloads/tangled.pdf; Global 
Policy Forum Europe, Speaking Notes, Whose Partnership for Whose Development? 
Corporate Accountability in the U.N. System Beyond the Global Compact, 2 (July 4, 
2007), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/17222782/20070704-Global-Compac 
t-Alternative-Hearing-2007. 
 112. Norms Commentary, supra note 110, ¶ 15. 
 113. Norms, supra note 100, ¶ 16. 
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included: the full U.N. Commission on Human Rights (the 
“Commission” or the “Council”), the Sub-Commission, NGOs, labor 
unions, individuals and others.114 Specifically, NGOs, labor unions, and 
other individuals submit information to either the Council or Sub-
Commission. In turn, the two U.N. bodies, after receiving feedback from 
a TNC, could use the information received as a means to take “effective 
action” against the corporation. 
Finally, the Norms co-opt the term “sphere of influence” from the 
voluntary Global Compact, applying and expanding it to a mandatory 
accountability mechanism for TNCs. Specifically, the Norms state that 
within their “respective spheres of activity and influence,” TNCs must 
respect and promote human rights.115 While never specifically defining 
the term, the Commentary offers an explanatory note on the idea by 
stating that TNCs’ obligations under the Norms apply “equally to 
activities occurring in the home country or territory . . . and in any 
country in which the business is engaged in activities.”116 It seems, 
therefore, that the use of the term shifted from the Global Compact 
(using “influence” to reference a TNC’s operational control) to a wider 
understanding that included both operational and spatial control.117 
Therefore, the Sub-Commission’s work took a decisive step towards 
bringing an international accountability structure to bear on TNCs. 
Unfortunately, in the wake of the Norms’ eventual defeat, that agenda 
was left in a state of flux. 
2. The Backlash 
Specifically, there was a considerable amount of discord over how 
various camps at the U.N. viewed the Norms. Although the Commission 
eventually turned down the Norms in 2003, the Sub-Commission had 
                                                                                                                 
 114. Norms Commentary, supra note 110, ¶ 16(b). 
 115. Norms, supra note 100, ¶ 1. 
 116. Norms Commentary, supra note 110, ¶ 1(a). 
 117. Id. ¶¶ 1(a)–(b) (discussing both the geographical and operational influences 
that TNCs exert, stating that TNCs should “inform themselves of the human rights 
impact of their principal activities and major proposed activities so that they can further 
avoid complicity in human rights abuses). This language is particularly significant for 
the bystander paradigm, suggesting that while a TNC’s actions may not directly cause a 
human rights abuse, the TNC’s presence (and corresponding influence) can contribute 
to it. See discussion infra Part III.C for a more extensive analysis of this language’s 
application to a bystander framework. 
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unanimously adopted them previously.118 Unlike the U.N.’s previous 
effort to address business and human rights issues (largely through the 
Global Compact), the Norms were a top-down, mandatory framework 
that would hold TNCs liable under international law for failing to 
respect human rights. Moreover, the Norms seemed to reflect the 
growing frustration held by many in the international community 
regarding the lack of accountability mechanisms for TNCs.  
Nevertheless, before the Norms were even considered by the full 
Council, the consensus was that the Council would not pass them.119 As 
one U.N. representative noted at the time: 
There is not much enthusiasm in Geneva for the Norms where it is 
felt that the Sub-Commission was trying to do two different things: 
i) distil everything from existing standards and ii) put this in treaty-
like language. This raises all kind [sic] of legal questions, as in the 
end it is States that are responsible for human rights, not MNCs.120 
Many felt that the Norms were, in effect, dead on arrival,121 and 
indeed they were. When the Council took up the Norms in 2004, it 
“expressed [its] appreciation to the Sub-Commission for the work it had 
undertaken in preparing [the Norms] . . . . It affirmed, however, that the 
document had not been requested and . . . had no legal standing.”122 
                                                                                                                 
 118. The U.N. Commission on Human Rights and its Sub-Commission, the two 
bodies that voted on the Norms, no longer exist. The work that was undertaken by these 
two committees is now taken up by the U.N. Human Rights Council and the Human 
Rights Council Advisory Committee respectively. For the purpose of simplification, I 
use the latter terms for each from this point forward, regardless of when the relevant 
decision was rendered. For a timeline of when these names changed, see infra 
Appendix A. 
 119. IRENE et al., The UN Norms for Business: Process, Content and Real Value, 
10 (May 12, 2004), available at http://www.irene-network.nl/download/pubdebate.pdf 
[hereinafter Public Debate Report]. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Larry Catá Backer, Multinational Corporations, Transnational Law: the United 
Nation’s Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations as a Harbinger 
of Corporate Social Responsibility in International Law, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 
287, 288 (2006). 
 122. Comm’n on Hum. Rts., Summaries of Post-Sessional Meetings and Other 
Activities of the Expanded Bureau During the Period from May to September 2004, 
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Indeed, the response to the Norms, particularly among the business 
community, was swift, ferocious, and effective.123 During public debate 
on the Norms, Deputy-Director General of the Confederation of British 
Industries stated: “It is quite wrong to suggest that firms are generally 
involved in widespread abuse of human rights – where is the 
evidence?”124 
Ruggie himself was one of the Norms’ most vocal critics. 
Reflecting back on the climate in which the Norms were created, Ruggie 
stated: 
The Norms exercise became engulfed by its own doctrinal excesses.  
Even leaving aside the highly contentious though largely symbolic 
proposal to monitor firms and provide for reparation payments to 
victims, its exaggerated legal claims and conceptual ambiguities 
created confusion and doubt even among many mainstream 
international lawyers and other impartial observers. Two aspects are 
particularly problematic in the context of this mandate. One concerns 
the legal authority advanced for the Norms, and the other the 
principle by which they propose to allocate human rights 
responsibilities between states and firms.125 
                                                                                                                 
transmitted by Note of the Secretariat, at 27, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/IM/2004/2 (Sept. 28, 
2004), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/chr/informal/documents.htm. 
In fact, the Sub-Commission had been working on the Norms for four years before they 
submitted their final report. When asked during a public debate why the Commission 
let the Sub-Commission work on the report for four years unmolested, Piet De Klerk, 
Human Rights Ambassador responded, “[b]ecause it was not on the agenda.” Public 
Debate Report, supra note 119. 
 123. LOUISE J. OBARA, UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION OPEN FOR BUSINESS? THE 
APPOINTMENT OF A SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE ON BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
available at http://www.brass.cf.ac.uk/uploads/United_Nations_Commission_Open_for 
_Business.pdf (discussing the business community’s response to the Norms and the 
subsequent resolution requesting a Special Representative). 
 124. David Gow, CBI Cries Foul over U.N. Human Rights Code, GUARDIAN           
(U. K.), Mar. 8, 2004, http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2004/mar/08/globalisation.  
Note that the business community once again employed its bystander strategy in an 
effort to defeat the Norms. The argument did not focus on the frequency of human 
rights abuses, but rather placed the burden of showing TNCs’ involvement on the 
human rights victims and advocates. 
 125. 2006 Interim Report, supra note 34, ¶ 59. Ruggie has asserted that many 
human rights organizations have told him privately that they found the Norms to be a 
“deeply flawed instrument.” JOHN RUGGIE, RESPONSE BY JOHN RUGGIE TO 
MISEREOR/GLOBAL POLICY FORUM (June 2, 2008), available at http://www.reports-and-
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Ruggie’s argument reflects the two biggest complaints against the 
Norms: their source of legitimacy and their target for accountability.126 
In short, Ruggie and others argued that the Norms were created with no 
legal mandate, while attempting to hold TNCs accountable under 
international law. According to Ruggie, neither tenet properly reflected 
international law at the time.127 
Not everyone, however, agreed with Ruggie’s assessment. Some 
scholars have argued that the Norms were merely a restatement of  
international law at the time.128 Likewise, the Sub-Commission itself, in 
                                                                                                                 
materials.org/Ruggie-response-to-Misereor-GPF-2-Jun-2008.pdf [hereinafter 
RESPONSE: GLOBAL POLICY FORUM]. 
 126. 2006 Interim Report, supra note 34, ¶ 59. 
 127. Id. 
 128. See, e.g., David Weissbrodt & Muria Kruger, Norms on the Responsibilities of 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human 
Rights, 97 AM. J. OF INT’L L. 901, 915 (2003) (“Hence, the legal authority of the Norms 
now derives principally from their sources in international law as a restatement of legal 
principles applicable to companies, but they have room to become more binding in the 
future.”); Backer, supra note 121, at 287-288 (“The Norms are unlikely to be adopted in 
any sort of binding form in the current round of negotiation respecting its final form.”); 
Lauren A. Dellinger, Corporate Social Responsibility: A Multifaceted Tool to Avoid 
Alien Tort Claims Act Litigation While Simultaneously Building a Better Business 
Reputation, 40 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 55, 65 (2009) (“Although the U.N. Norms provide an 
excellent framework for transnational corporations to implement internal codes of 
conduct, there are no concrete enforcement measures, nor are there fully developed 
monitoring and verification mechanisms.”); David Kinley & Rachel Chambers, The 
U.N. Human Rights Norms for Corporations: The Private Implications of Public 
International Law, 6 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 447, 482 (2006) (“The most that can be said 
regarding the Norms’ legal status, is that any existing international law (as it applies to 
states) that has been codified in sections of the Norms obviously retains its force as 
international law and is unchanged by its re-statement in certain paragraphs of the 
Norms. These paragraphs may be described as having a ‘declaratory effect’. They 
merely reinforce rights contained in either customary international law or treaties.”); 
see also Hum. Rts. Council, General Debate item 3 - Human Rights and Transnational 
Corporations, Joint Statement 14th Session of the Human Rights Council, Geneva (Jun. 
4, 2010), available at http://www.escr-net.org/usr_doc/JointBHRHRCStatement_HRW 
_ESCRNet_2010.pdf (questioning Ruggie’s proposition “that the corporate 
responsibility to respect rights is not an obligation that current international human 
rights law generally imposes directly on companies but rather constitutes ‘a standard of 
expected social conduct’”). 
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the Norms’ introduction, argued that they were legal restatements, 
crafted, as one author notes, in “an attempt to comprehend and 
understand international law and gather it together in one document for 
easy reference by transnational corporations and human rights 
activists.”129 
Indeed, the disconnect between the Sub-Commission’s unanimous 
vote to adopt the Norms and its eventual defeat by Council has been 
largely overlooked.130 Part of the reason for the defeat may have been 
process. The Sub-Commission was not operating under a mandate when 
it drafted the Norms.  In addition, the first time the issue was placed on 
the full Council’s agenda came only after the Sub-Commission had 
already adopted the Norms. The full Council might have felt blind-
sided, particularly after the TNC lobbying effort went into effect.131 
However, an equally likely explanation for the Norms’ defeat is the 
clear accountability structure that the Norms would have placed on 
corporations. Many business representatives pointed to the Global 
Compact as a more suitable paradigm for assessing corporate 
performance in the arena of human rights.132 In contrast, given the 
Norm’s enforcement mechanisms, it is of little wonder that the human 
rights community was quick to embrace them.133 
Despite the Norms’ defeat, they represent, at a minimum, an 
important historical moment in the evolution of the business and human 
rights agenda. In reality, however, their importance is much greater. The 
Norms represent an important shift in dialogue, whereby TNCs for the 
first time were brought into the debate on human rights from an 
accountability grounded framework rather than a voluntary framework. 
                                                                                                                 
That view is open to debate and in any case the law is highly dynamic and can adapt 
to meet pressing needs. Looking to the future, there is important scope for the Council 
to consider the actual and potential role of international law in further defining the 
corporate responsibility for human rights. 
Id. 
 129. Richard Williamson, Human Rights: A Common Cause, LEGALWEEK.COM 
(Oct. 2, 2003, 1:00 AM). 
 130. See Comm’n on Hum. Rts., Subcomm, Rep. of the Sub-Comm’n on the 
Promotion and Protection of Hum. Rts. on its 55th Sess., July 28-Aug. 15, 2003, ¶ 81, 
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/2 (Oct. 20, 2003) (by Stanislav Ogurtsov). 
 131. For an account of the lobbying efforts by businesses to defeat the Norms, see 
Gow, supra note 124. 
 132. Williamson, supra note 129. 
 133. In fact, many of the NGOs that had worked on the Global Compact quickly 
turned to the Norms as an alternative measuring stick for holding TNCs accountable. Id. 
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Therefore, the Norms remain significant because they are, to date, the 
only U.N.-generated document that provides an accountability 
mechanism for TNCs on the issue of business and human rights. In this 
way, the Norms continue to be a touchstone and resource for those 
seeking to examine corporate responsibility from a legal rather than 
simply moral standpoint. 
 
C. THE HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL’S MANDATES TO SPECIAL 
REPRESENTATIVE JOHN RUGGIE 
Once the Norms were defeated by the Council in 2005, advocates 
could have reasonably thought that the U.N.’s business and human 
rights agenda had permanently stalled.134 Instead, the Council’s next 
action led to its most active period for the development of the subject. In 
2005, the Council asked Annan to appoint a Special Representative to 
report to the Council on human rights issues with regard to TNCs.135 The 
Secretary-General appointed Ruggie.136 What followed were six years of 
annual reports that had two key milestones: the development of the 
                                                                                                                 
 134. At least one advocacy group that monitored the U.N.’s 61st session called the 
Council’s work “disappointing.” In fact, the concerns by advocates regarding business 
and human rights seemed to have been embroiled in larger concerns in the international 
community regarding the overall effectiveness of the U.N. Commission on Human 
Rights. Hum. Rts. Watch, U.N. Rights Body Ignores Major Abuses: U.N. Commission 
on Human Rights Takes a Few Positive Steps, HUM. RTS. WATCH, Apr. 21, 2005, 
http://www.hrw.org/print/news/2005/04/21/un-rights-body-ignores-major-abuses. 
 135. Even this resolution was divisive. The business communities once again 
lobbied against the appointment of a special representative, arguing that the U.N. was 
the wrong arena for crafting legal human rights frameworks that apply to TNCs. 
OBARA, supra note 123; Comm’n on Hum. Rts., Hum. Rts. Res. 2005/69: Human 
Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, 59th mtg., U.N. 
Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2005/69 (Apr. 20, 2005), available at www.unhcr.org/refworld/doci 
d/45377c80c.html. 
 135. 2006 Interim Report, supra note 34, ¶ 1. 
 136. Press Release, Secretary-General Appoints John Ruggie of United States 
Representative on Issues of Human Rights, Transnational Corporations, Other Business 
Enterprises (July 28, 2005), available at www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/45377c80c 
.html. 
 136. See 2006 Interim Report, supra note 34, ¶ 1. 
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Respect Framework in 2008 and the U.N. Human Rights Council’s 
approval of the Guiding Principles in 2011. 
Generally, the purpose of the first mandate was to frame the issues 
that affect TNCs in the field of human rights and provide context for the 
official report that would succeed it. Specifically, Ruggie’s original 
mandate was to 
 
 Identify (and where necessary, clarify) the various 
standards that affect TNCs regarding human rights; 
 Discuss the role of the States and their duty in regulating 
human rights abuses within their borders; 
 Research and clarify how terms such as “complicity” and 
“sphere of influence” apply to TNCs; 
 Develop materials to assist TNCs in implementing human 
rights impact assessments; and 
 Compile a “compendium of best practices” for both States 
and TNCs to follow.137 
 
In order to complete the first mandate, Ruggie spent much of his 
time meeting with members of the world community, including “States, 
non-governmental organizations, international business associations and 
individual companies, international labour federations, United Nations 
and other international agencies, and legal experts.”138 Human rights 
advocates urged Ruggie to construct a framework based on the Norms. 
The business community argued in favor of a Global Compact-like 
mechanism. After his consultations, Ruggie issued an interim report on 
February 22, 2006.139 
1. The 2006 Interim Report 
The purpose of the Interim Report was to provide context to the 
Council regarding Ruggie’s mandate, set forth his strategy for fulfilling 
the mandate, and summarize next steps.140 To that end, the Interim 
                                                                                                                 
 137. See 2006 Interim Report, supra note 34, ¶ 1. 
 138. Id. ¶ 3. Notably absent from this initial list was a discussion with the victims of 
human rights abuses themselves. The 2006 Interim Report also alludes to the acrimony 
that surrounded the drafting and voting on the U.N. Norms. Id. (commenting on “the 
history that preceded its creation”). 
 139. See id. 
 140. Id. at Summary. 
908 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XVII 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
 
Report summarizes the factors that led to the shifting landscape of 
international law, specifically with regard to business and human rights. 
To Ruggie, one of the most significant factors to change the business 
and human rights landscape was the rise of globalization. As he pointed 
out, at the time of the creation of the U.N. in 1945, the international 
order was “state-based.” Ruggie noted that in the immediate aftermath 
of World War II “the term ‘inter-national economy’ was still an accurate 
spatial description of the prevailing reality.”141 Yet, since then, Ruggie 
has noted that a “variety of actors for which the territorial State is not 
the cardinal organizing principle have come to play significant public 
roles.”142 His comments suggest that there is a growing recognition of 
non-state actors, particularly corporations, that have legal personalities 
in the international law realm.143 
In light of this reality, Ruggie undertook in his 2007 Report to map 
the various standards and mechanisms that the international arena had at 
its disposal for business and human rights issues. 
2. The 2007 Report 
On February 9, 2007, Ruggie followed up his interim report with an 
official report, which at the time was to end his mandate. The report, 
entitled “Business and Human Rights: Mapping International Standards 
                                                                                                                 
 141. Id. ¶ 10. This idea of moving away from the spatial direction of the nation-state 
has taken hold outside the arena of human rights work. For instance, Lara Putnam, a 
history professor, discusses historians’ struggle to recount history without a nation-state 
reference point. See Lara Putnam, To Study the Fragments/Whole: Microhistory and the 
Atlantic World, 30 J. SOC. HIST. 3 (Spring 2006). 
 142. 2006 Interim Report, supra note 34, at ¶ 10. 
 143. Later, Ruggie clarified this by suggesting that more and more, corporations are 
becoming subjects of international law, just simply not in the context of international 
human rights abuses. See Respect Framework, supra note 13, ¶ 20; see also David 
Kinley & Rachel Chambers, The U.N. Human Rights Norms for Corporations: The 
Private Implications of Public International Law, 6 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 447, 480 (2006) 
(“[I]t can be seen that companies, according to the widely accepted qualifying criteria, 
have at least some form of legal personality in public international law. This is not 
exactly the same type of personality as that of states, but this does not negate its 
existence.”) 
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of Responsibility and Accountability for Corporate Acts,”144 was 
submitted to the Council. The Report summarized the state of 
international law with regard to business and human rights, but 
specifically did not offer recommendations for the future as the mandate 
requested. Instead, Ruggie requested an additional year to fulfill the 
mandate’s request on this point.145 
In the 2007 Report, Ruggie discusses the growing focus (in the 
international arena) on ways to hold TNCs liable for human rights 
violations.146 States have a duty to protect substantive rights abuses by 
third parties, but a large number of States admit that they do not have 
any policies, programs, or tools in place to deal with corporate human 
rights abuses.147 In fact, many rely on the framework of voluntary 
corporate initiatives for governance.148 Therefore, if a particular state has 
no real accountability mechanism (such as in weak governance zones), 
Ruggie acknowledges that victims are often left without recourse.149 
The 2007 Report also refutes the idea that international law, at the 
time of the Report, permitted the direct accountability of TNCs for 
human rights violations.150 Therefore, the Report directly refutes legal 
claims embodied in the Norms—namely that several human rights 
treaties allow for direct accountability mechanisms for TNCs under 
international law. Finally, while the Report does acknowledge the 
existence of various “soft law” mechanisms—whereby voluntary 
initiatives may be the source for future binding actions—Ruggie claims 
                                                                                                                 
 144. 2007 Report, supra note 9. 
 145. Id. at ¶ 9. Although outside the scope of this Article, the 2007 Report flagged 
the extraterritorial obligations that one State may undertake when another State is not 
adequately protecting the people within its borders from human rights abuses. 2007 
Report, supra note 9, ¶ 15. Ruggie assesses that, under current international law, a State 
is neither required nor prohibited from exercising some power—particularly in those 
instances when the people needing protection are the nationals of another State. Id. at 
n.5. 
 146. Id. ¶ 44 (stating that “corporations are under growing scrutiny by the 
international human rights mechanisms”). 
 147. 2007 Report, supra note 9, at ¶¶ 16-17. 
 148. Id. at ¶ 17. 
 149. See id. ¶ 16 (“The increasing focus on protection against corporate abuse by the 
U.N. treaty bodies and regional mechanisms indicates growing concern that states either 
do not fully understand or are not always able or willing to [fulfill] this duty.”). 
 150. Id. ¶ 44. 
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that “no definitive standards yet exist by which to assess [these 
mechanisms].”151 
The most promising aspect of the 2007 Report is its discussion of 
notions of complicity under international law for TNCs and human 
rights abuses. According to the 2007 Report: 
Corporate complicity is an umbrella term for a range of ways in 
which companies may be liable for their participation in criminal or 
civil wrongs. . . . The international tribunals have developed a fairly 
clear standard for criminal aiding and abetting liability: knowingly 
providing practical assistance, encouragement or moral support that 
has a substantial effect on the commission of a crime.152   
The term “moral support,” although not adopted universally,153 
would seem to capture a widening array of actions, or even inactions. As 
Ruggie notes, some tribunals have even used the element to include 
“silent presence coupled with authority.”154 According to Ruggie, there 
is very little clarity on what factual scenarios would constitute moral 
support.155 
This dilemma highlights why developing a bystander framework is 
so important. States are either unable or unwilling to provide the 
protection for corporate related abuses. As Ruggie writes: 
[O]f those states responding very few report having policies, 
programs or tools designed specifically to deal with corporate human 
rights challenges. A larger number say they rely on the framework of 
corporate responsibility initiatives, including such soft law 
                                                                                                                 
 151. Id. ¶ 56. 
 152. Id. ¶ 31 (emphasis added). 
 153. For instance, as Ruggie notes, the court in Unocal did not adopt this as an 
element in its analysis of complicity. Id. ¶ 31 n.29. 
 154. Id. ¶ 32. 
 155. Id. The focus of moral support seems to be related to (1) a direct or indirect 
benefit and (2) some form of assistance (and therefore action). Therefore, while 
promising (and probably the closest idea to a bystander framework) this element still 
falls short of providing a meaningful basis for a bystander-based accountability 
structure. 
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instruments as the OECD Guidelines or voluntary initiatives like the 
Global Compact.156 
This is ironic particularly given how many TNCs tout the use of 
voluntary mechanisms, and how many States rely on these voluntary 
mechanisms.157 
Overall, the 2007 Report provided an extensive assessment of 
current international law in the area of business and human rights. While 
the 2007 Report was undoubtedly helpful in providing the foundation 
for Ruggie and his work, it was not until the 2008 Report, which 
contained Ruggie’s recommendations, that the U.N. came into its own 
on the issue of business and human rights. 
3. The 2008 Report: “Protect, Respect and Remedy” 
On April 7, 2008, Ruggie submitted his second official report.158 
This second official report, entitled “Protect, Respect and Remedy: A 
Framework for Business and Human Rights” (the “Framework” or the 
“Respect Framework”), provided Ruggie’s views and recommendations 
on the best way to address business and human rights issues. 
The Framework stands on three essential pillars: (1) the State’s 
legal duty to protect individuals and communities from human rights 
abuses committed by others, including corporations; (2) a responsibility 
by corporations to respect human rights; and (3) an amelioration of 
current remedy mechanisms when human rights abuses have occurred.159 
To some extent, the contents of the Respect Framework reflect the 
Global Compact, relating back in various ways to the spirit surrounding 
Ruggie’s earlier work.160 For instance, the Framework carries on the 
                                                                                                                 
 156. Id. ¶ 17. 
 157. The irony continues: given the clear lack of success these voluntary 
mechanisms have had in redressing human rights abuses, it is odd that a voluntary 
mechanism is still the primary framework in this area. 
 158. In his first official report, Ruggie requested more time to complete this part of 
the mandate. 
 159. Respect Framework, supra note 13, ¶ 9. 
 160. This may have been intentional. Given the acrimony and bitterness surrounding 
both the Norms themselves and the appointment of a Special Representative, Ruggie 
may have felt that the best policy was to hearken back to the policy he knew and for 
which he had already developed goodwill. Notably, the Framework and its 
implementation document, the Guiding Principles, nevertheless contained significant 
elements of the Norms. 
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Global Compact’s policy tradition by having no accountability 
mechanism for corporations. In fact, the Framework explicitly rejects 
the Norms’ attempt to craft TNC accountability mechanisms.161 
Furthermore, Ruggie argues that “as economic actors, companies have 
unique responsibilities. If those responsibilities are entangled with State 
obligations, it makes it difficult if not impossible to tell who is 
responsible for what in practice.”162 His contention suggests that the 
responsibility outlined in the Framework is in no way a legal one, but 
rather a values-based normative goal in which TNCs aspire to respect 
human rights.163 According to Ruggie, weak governance zones where 
TNCs are located are a primary challenge, and the 2008 Report once 
again emphasizes that “governance gaps are at the root of the business 
and human rights predicament.”164 In those areas, respecting human 
rights is increasingly problematic. 
Later in the Respect Framework, Ruggie raises the issue of TNC 
accountability within the context of spheres of influence165 and a 
company’s due diligence.166 Ruggie states, “the scope of due diligence 
to meet the corporate responsibility to respect human rights is not a 
fixed sphere, nor is it based on influence. Rather, it depends on the 
potential and actual human rights impacts resulting from a company’s 
business activities and the relationships connected to those activities.”167 
In doing so, Ruggie seems to reject the premise that TNCs have a 
specific, heightened duty for monitoring those human rights issues that 
affect their core business enterprises.  
All in all, notwithstanding its flaws, the Respect Framework is a 
great achievement. In the words of one scholar, it will act as “an 
authoritative focal point that could help bring coherence to the 
                                                                                                                 
 161. Id. ¶ 6. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. ¶ 54. 
 164. Id. ¶ 17. 
 165. Id. ¶¶ 65–72. 
 166. Id. ¶¶ 56–59. 
 167. Id. ¶ 72. 
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complexity of the business-human rights relationship.”168 Even though 
the Respect Framework lacks an accountability mechanism for TNCs, it 
gives very specific recommendations to TNCs seeking to navigate the 
business and human rights terrain. 
On June 18, 2008, The U.N. Human Rights Council unanimously 
adopted the Respect Framework and, by Resolution,169 renewed 
Ruggie’s term under a new mandate.170 The new mandate provided for 
eight specific requests, including 
 
 Ruggie’s views and “practical recommendations” on states’ 
duties regarding business and human rights issues; 
 More information regarding the interaction between 
corporate responsibility and human rights issues, along with 
“concrete guidance” on this to corporations and other 
stakeholders; 
 Options and recommendations for ways to improve victims’ 
access to remedies when corporate activities lead to human 
rights abuses; 
 Best practices for TNCs on the issue of business and human 
rights; and 
 Annual updates.171 
 
In response to the Council’s second mandate, Ruggie undertook an 
additional three-year term that involved a specific implementation 
program and a campaign to promote the Respect Framework. This 
culminated in the Guiding Principles.172 
                                                                                                                 
 168. Christiana Ochoa, The 2008 Ruggie Report: A Framework for Business and 
Human Rights, 12 AM. SOC’Y INT.’L L. 1, 8 (Jun. 18, 2008), available at 
http://www.asil.org/insights080618.cfm. 
 169. Hum. Rts. Council Res. 8/7, Mandate of the Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General on the Issue of Hum. Rts. and Transnat’l Corp. and other Bus. Enter., 
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/8/7 (June 18, 2008), available at http://ap.ohchr.org/documents 
/E/HRC/resolutions/A_HRC_RES_8_7.pdf. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. ¶¶ 4(a)–(c), (e), (h). 
 172. Guiding Principles, supra note 8. In the intervening years, Ruggie also 
provided the Council with annual reports on his progress. These included: the 2009 
Report (discussing, among other things, the financial crisis’s impact on business and 
human rights issues) and the 2010 Report. See 2009 Report, supra note 101; Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Hum. Rts. & Transn’l Corp. & 
Other Bus. Enter., Report on: Business and Human Rights: Further Steps Toward the 
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III.  THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES 
On March 21, 2011, Ruggie presented his Guiding Principles to the 
U.N. Human Rights Council for consideration. Through the Principles, 
Ruggie attempted to operationalize the Framework that he had 
submitted to the Council three years before. The Principles, as well as 
the Respect Framework on which they were based, were welcomed by 
the international community as a workable and practical framework to 
guide businesses and other stakeholders on how to implement a system 
to prevent and, if they occurred, redress human rights violations. The 
Principles consist of a number of foundational principles derived from 
the spirit of the Respect Framework, as well as new operational 
principles that build on the concepts embedded in the foundational 
principles.173 In addition, Ruggie provides commentary for many of the 
issues outlined in the Principles. 
Moreover, Ruggie made significant efforts to vet the Principles 
with the public and with all interested stakeholders before he presented 
them to the Council. For instance, on December 1, 2009, Ruggie 
launched a global online forum and requested comments regarding 
operationalizing the Respect Framework.174 From November 22, 2010, 
to January 31, 2011, Ruggie posted a draft of the Guiding Principles and 
then solicited comments on their themes. Comments flowed in. In all, 
Ruggie received approximately 163 comments on various aspects of the 
                                                                                                                 
Operationalization of the “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, Hum. Rts. 
Council, ¶¶ 16–53, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/27 (Apr. 9, 2010) (by John Ruggie), available 
at http://198.170.85.29/Ruggie-report-2010.pdf (focusing on the Respect Framework’s 
first pillar, the State’s duty to protect). 
 173. Guiding Principles, supra note 8. 
 174. The Forum closed in February 2011. Since then, the portal has been taken 
down and can no longer be accessed. For a press release of the launch see Press 
Release, United Nations, New Online Forum for Business & Human Rights Mandate, 
(Dec. 1, 2009), available at http://www.hks.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/CSRI/newsandstories/s 
rsg_forum_launch.pdf. While the forum initially focused on corporate responsibility to 
respect human rights, it was subsequently expanded to comment on all aspects of the 
Guiding Principles. 
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draft.175 Notably, many of the proposed changes that people suggested 
made their way into the final Principles.176 
 In addition, Ruggie requested specific feedback from key 
stakeholders, soliciting expert consultations and convening working 
groups and workshops.177 As a result, when the final Principles were 
submitted, they had wide-ranging endorsement from diverse 
stakeholders including specific businesses178 and industries,179 
governments,180 and nongovernmental organizations.181 
The human rights community, while receptive, was slightly more 
muted in welcoming the Principles. While prominent organizations 
praised the Principles,182 many other organizations felt that the 
                                                                                                                 
 175. Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary-General for Bus. & 
Hum. Rts., Online Forum (edited repository), (2011), http://www.business-humanr 
ights.org/media/documents/ruggie/online-forum-re-guiding-principles-nov-2010-to-jan-
2011.pdf. 
 176. Id. ¶ 5 (“absent any internationally-recognized hierarchy of treaty obligations, 
States are unlikely to place every single human right they have recognized above their 
legal obligations”). Cf. Guiding Principles, supra note 8 (eliminating that language). 
This statement, in particular, drew a number of comments questioning its accuracy. 
 177. Document List, supra note 15, at 15. 
 178. See, e.g., ING Congratulates U.N. Special Representative John Ruggie & His 
Team on Endorsement of Guiding Principles, ONESOCIETYINITIATIVE.ORG, June 24, 
2011, http://onesocietyinitiative.org/ing-congratulates-un-special-representative-john-ru 
ggie-a-his-team-on-endorsement-of-guiding-principles-80 (stating that the Principles 
are “an important milestone in the protection and promotion of human rights linked to 
business activities”). 
 179. Letter of Support from the Int’l Bus. Leaders Forum for the U.N. Protect, 
Respect and Remedy Framework, to John Ruggie, the Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General, (June 16, 2011), available at http://www.business-humanrights.org 
/Links/Repository/1006814. 
 180. See, e.g., Press Release, Humanrights.gov, Businesses and Transactional 
Corporations Have a Responsibility to Respect Human Rights (June 16, 2011), 
available at http://www.humanrights.gov/2011/06/16/businesses-and-transnational-corp 
orations-have-a-responsibility-to-respect-human-rights/ (“The United States is pleased 
to cosponsor this Resolution [adopting the Guiding Principles]”). 
 181. See, e.g., Public Statement, Document - United Nations: A Call for Action to 
Better Protect the Rights of Those Affected by Business-Related Human Rights Abuses, 
AMNESTYINTERNATIONAL.ORG (June 14, 2011), available at http://www.amnesty.org/e 
n/library/asset/IOR40/009/2011/en/55fab4a5-fb8a-4572-93f3-67581b2dca45/ior400092 
011en.html (stating that the Respect Framework should be “the focal point for moving 
forward”). 
 182. Id. (stating that Ruggie was to be “commended for developing and raising 
awareness on the Framework”). 
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Principles were fundamentally flawed because they did not include 
either a mandatory system or a monitoring mechanism.183 Thus, in one 
sense, the Principles might have been seen as more of the same, relying 
on businesses to self-monitor in order to achieve benefits for affected 
communities much like previous frameworks.184 
While the critics’ claims do have some merit, a solid analysis of the 
Principles requires a much more nuanced approach. A comprehensive 
analysis of the Principles must include not simply an analysis of the text 
itself, but also a review of the following: (1) the context and climate in 
which the Principles arose (as well as a comparison of the climate in 
which the Norms were given); and (2) the process through which they 
were drafted. Without taking these factors into account, a full analysis of 
the Principles will be incomplete. 
A. THE BACKGROUND 
Some185 have attributed the widespread acceptance of the Guiding 
Principles to the transparent process that Ruggie undertook in his work, 
including giving speeches, presenting interim reports, having sector 
                                                                                                                 
 183. See, e.g., U.N. Human Rights Council Adopts Guiding Principles on Business 
Conduct, yet Victims Still Waiting for Effective Remedies, FIDH (June 17, 2011),  
available at http://www.fidh.org/UN-Human-Rights-Council-adopts-Guiding-Principles  
(proffering its main criticism, which is the lack of remedies available: “FIDH, along 
with several civil society organisations, has expressed concern on certain weaknesses in 
the Principles during the drafting process, in particular on the right to an effective 
remedy and the need for States’ measures to prevent abuses committed by their 
companies overseas.”); Hum. Rts. Watch, News Release, U.N. Human Rights Council: 
Weak Stance on Business Standards, June 16, 2011, http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/06/ 
16/un-human-rights-council-weak-stance-business-standards (“‘The council failed to 
put in place a mechanism to ensure that the basic steps to protect human rights set forth 
in the Guiding Principles are put into practice,’ Human Rights Watch said.”). 
 184. See Marcy Murninghan, Human Rights: A Moral and Material Business 
Concern, THE MURNINGHAN POST, June 30, 2011, http://www.murninghanpost.com/20 
11/06/30/human-rights-a-moral-and-material-business-concern/. 
 185. Letter from John K.S. Wilson, Dir.-Corp. Governance, TIAA-CREF, to John 
Ruggie, Special Representative of U.N. Secretary-General for Bus. & Hum. Rts., (May 
10, 2011), available at http://www.business-humanrights.org/media/documents/ruggie/ 
tiaa-cref-ltr-to-ruggie-re-guiding-principles-10-may-2011.pdf. 
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consultations and holding legal workshops.186 In addition, Ruggie’s 
work in responding to the U.N. mandates can be seen as nothing less 
than thorough. Besides drafting and preparing reports for the Council, 
the work Ruggie and his team did included (1) undertaking a full 
analysis of the various treaties that implicate corporate activities and 
human rights issues; (2) convening legal workshops on a number of 
issues affecting business and human rights; (3) reviewing methodologies 
of human rights impact assessments for TNCs; (4) surveying numerous 
corporations regarding how they handle corporate social responsibility 
issues; and (5) reviewing State and regional provisions regarding 
business and human rights.187 
As a result, a number of different legal organizations endorsed 
Ruggie’s Guiding Principles. The International Bar Association’s CSR 
committee called the measure “timely, practical guidance on many 
complex issues of business and human rights”188 and urged the Council 
to endorse them. The International Senior Lawyers Project stated that 
“the Principles will undoubtedly [be] the starting point for guiding—and 
judging—business efforts to identify, manage and remedy human 
rights.”189 
In addition, while business communities had some initial 
misgivings after the draft Guiding Principles began to circulate, law 
firms took great strides to reassure their (often corporate) clients that 
neither the Guiding Principles nor the Respect Framework was attaching 
legal accountability to TNCs.190 
                                                                                                                 
 186. See generally Document List, supra note 15. 
 187. See generally id. 
 188. Letter from Craig Phillips, Co-Chair IBA CSR Committee, and Kenneth 
Thompson II, Co-Chair IBA CSR Committee, to John Ruggie, Special Representative 
of U.N. Secretary-General for Bus. & Hum. Rts. (May 25, 2011), available at 
http://www.business-humanrights.org/media/documents/ruggie/intl-bar-association-ltr-
to-ruggie-25-may-2011.pdf. 
 189. Memorandum from Int’l Seniors Law. Project (May 12, 2011), available at 
http://www.business-humanrights.org/media/documents/ruggie/intl-senior-lawyers-proj 
ect-ltr-re-guiding-principles-12-may-2011.pdf. 
 190. See, e.g., Memorandum from Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP on Corporate 
Social Responsibility for Human Rights: Comments on the U.N. Special 
Representative’s Report Entitled “Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for 
Business and Human Rights” (May, 22, 2008), available at http://198.170.85.29/Weil-
Gotshal-legal-commentary-on-Ruggie-report-22-May-2008.pdf (stating “we have been 
assured by the Special Representative himself that . . . his use of the term 
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This development of the Guiding Principles stands in stark contrast 
to that of the Norms. Although it took over four years for the Sub-
Commission to craft the Norms, they did so without any mandate by the 
Council.191 In addition, while it seems the Sub-Commission solicited 
some input from the business community,192 many corporations later 
complained that the Sub-Commission undertook their work in a very 
opaque way.193 Because Sub-Commission members who drafted the 
Norms were acting in their personal capacities—not as representatives 
of their governments194—they were not bound by the political 
considerations of the full Council.195 Given this lack of transparency, 
open communication and political considerations, it seems likely that 
part of the reason why the Norms were rejected, almost out of hand, 
stemmed at least in part from their opaque process.196 
B.  TEXTUAL ANALYSIS 
The Guiding Principles consist of eight foundational principles and 
twenty-four operational principles. They address a variety of issues in 
the area of business and human rights, including state-owned business, 
human rights impact assessments and implementation of corporate 
responsibilities for business and human rights issues. 
Building on the three pillars originally outlined in the Respect 
Framework (a State’s Duty to Protect individuals from human rights 
abuse; TNCs’ duty to respect human rights; and increased access to 
                                                                                                                 
‘responsibility’ in the Report refers to moral obligations and social expectations—not 
binding law.”). 
 191. Public Debate Report, supra note 119. 
 192. Williamson, supra note 129. 
 193. Kinley et al., supra note 64, at 464. 
 194. Williamson, supra note 129. 
 195. In fact, many of them were law professors. Id. 
 196. Of course, an equally likely explanation is that the lack of transparency was 
merely used as a red herring by business leaders and States to avoid the accountability 
provisions of the Norms. For instance, one of the main criticisms lodged against the 
Norms was that it was created without a mandate of the full Council. However, drafting 
without a mandate apparently had precedent at the U.N. Kinley et al., supra note 64, at 
466 (offering a far-reaching review of the politics and backdoor negotiations that led to 
the Norm’s defeat). 
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remedies for victims of human rights violations) the Principles provide 
concrete, practical solutions for TNCs who wish to craft a workable 
policy regarding business and human rights.197 
The Principles also reaffirm their nonlegal accountability 
framework. For instance, in Ruggie’s commentary accompanying the 
foundational principle that outlines the legal foundation for “the 
responsibility of business enterprises to respect human rights,”198 he 
makes clear that “the responsibility of business enterprises to respect 
human rights is distinct from issues of legal liability and enforcement, 
which remains defined largely by national law provisions in relevant 
jurisdictions.”199 Once again, the Principles emphasize that the term 
“responsibility” (as discussed in the Respect Framework and here) is not 
in any way meant to convey legal responsibility on the part of TNCs. 
Rather, it is designed to encourage moral responsibility based on shared 
societal values regarding human rights issues. 
Notably, however, within the parameter of corporate responsibility, 
the Principles are specific. The document lays out five foundational 
principles to guide TNCs in their responsibilities concerning human 
rights. First, it states that TNCs should respect human rights by avoiding 
infringing on the human rights of others.200 Second, various legal 
instruments should be used to determine the appropriate TNC human 
rights standards.201 Third, in order to respect human rights, TNCs should 
“avoid causing or contributing” to human rights abuses and “prevent or 
mitigate” human rights activities that are linked to their operations.202 
Fourth, while all corporations (regardless of size) are responsible for 
respecting human rights, how businesses manage this responsibility will 
vary based on the size and structure of the operation, as well as the 
severity of its human rights impacts.203 Finally, TNCs must develop and 
                                                                                                                 
 197. While all three pillars implicate business and human rights, this Article focuses 
on the responsibilities TNCs have to respect human rights. 
 198. Guiding Principles, supra note 8, § II.A, ¶ 12, at 13. 
 199. Id. at 13–14 (accompanying commentary). 
 200. Id. § II.A, ¶ 11, at 13. 
 201. Id. § II.A, ¶ 12. These instruments include the International Bill of Rights and 
the International Labor Organization’s Declaration on the Fundamental Principles and 
Rights at Work (accompanying commentary). 
 202. Id. § II.A, ¶ 13, at 14. 
 203. Id. § II.A, ¶ 14. 
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implement specific policies and procedures to help maintain 
responsibility for human rights.204 
In order to operationalize these foundational principles, Ruggie 
states that TNCs should demonstrate a firm commitment to the issues 
regarding business and human rights by integrating the subject 
throughout the corporate structure.205 In addition, TNCs must conduct 
due diligence, including assessments of how their operations (both 
actual and potential) will impact the community around them 
(specifically from a human rights perspective).206 This assessment 
should be done early and updated regularly, to ensure that the situations 
that TNCs initially evaluated have not changed.207 Finally, TNCs should 
integrate the results from their assessments208 into all aspects of their 
operations, consult with experts and other stakeholders, track the 
response to their human rights policies, and maintain transparency and 
open communications with stakeholders on these issues.209 
The Principles also state that, should a TNC’s activities result in 
adverse human rights impacts, the TNC should immediately take steps 
to redress and remediate the harm.210 The Principles, and the Respect 
Framework on which they are based, provide extensive guidance to 
TNCs who face legitimate questions regarding their role in human rights 
issues.  
                                                                                                                 
 204. Id. § II.A, ¶ 15, at 15. 
 205. Id. § II.B, ¶ 16. 
 206. Id. § II.B, ¶ 17, at 16. 
 207. Id. (and accompanying commentary). 
 208. As it stands now, many business partners seem to be in favor of a move  
towards internal TNC human rights impacts assessment. See, e.g., Letter from Robert 
Davies, Chief Exec. Officer, Int’l Bus. Leaders Forum, to John Ruggie, U.N. Special 
Representative to the Secretary-General on Bus. & Hum. Rts., (Jan. 12, 2007), 
available at http://www.business-humanrights.org/Documents/). However, some in the 
United States are concerned that producing additional assessments would create 
additional legal liability for corporations. 2009 Report, supra note 101. Ruggie 
dismisses these concerns by arguing that the call for greater disclosure will lead to legal 
liability only if a corporation omits or misrepresents material facts. Id. at ¶ 82 (2009 
Report). 
 209. Guiding Principles, supra note 8, § II.B, ¶¶ 18–21, at 17–20. 
 210. Id. § II.B, ¶ 22, at 20. 
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Overall, the Principles are incomplete, notwithstanding the 
significant leap forward taken by the Principles and the Respect 
Framework regarding a bystander paradigm in their discussion of TNCs’ 
relationships (not just actions) as a source for assessing appropriate 
responses. Because the Principles rely on a system of self-monitoring 
for TNCs and remain silent on accountability mechanisms, they offer a 
more modest approach to tackling the issue of business and human 
rights than the Sub-Commission’s work with the Norms. For some, it 
seems apparent that Ruggie’s work did not go far enough. One writer 
states that Ruggie’s report, although identifying governance gaps, does 
not in fact respond to those gaps with solutions: “Instead, it is limited to 
what its author deems politically achievable.”211 
C. IMPACT ON A BYSTANDER FRAMEWORK 
There is no doubt that Ruggie’s work will influence the 
development of international human rights law. Previously, issues of 
corporate actors and human rights had been dealt with under specific 
subject matters, such as labor issues and workers’ rights. There was 
little, if any, dialogue in the international law arena that discussed ideas 
                                                                                                                 
 211. JENS MARTENS, PROBLEMATIC PRAGMATISM, THE RUGGIE REPORT 2008: 
BACKGROUND, ANALYSIS AND PERSPECTIVES 1 (Elisabeth Strohscheidt, Misereor, ed., 
June 2008), available at http://www.wdev.eu/downloads/martensstrohscheidt.pdf. For 
Ruggie’s vigorous response to the piece see RESPONSE: GLOBAL POLICY FORUM, supra 
note 125. While Ruggie does not deny the claim that his report was politically 
expedient (“[o]ne obvious question to ask is what purpose would be served by making 
recommendations that aren’t feasible”), he takes issue with the tone of the Global 
Policy Report stating: “I would have hoped that the level of maturity in the business and 
human rights debate would have been sufficiently elevated by now for these tactics to 
have been confined to a dust bin.” Id. In the end, some scholars tend to agree that 
Ruggie achieved the best result he could under the circumstances. For instance, John 
Knox, in analyzing Ruggie’s approach to his mandate summarized the challenge 
Ruggie faced: 
This situation presented Ruggie with an extraordinarily difficult political calculus. To 
develop a consensus on how to bring human rights law to bear on corporations, 
Ruggie had to propose an alternative to the Norms that addressed the desire for a 
robust application of human rights law to corporations but did not alienate the 
governments whose cooperation would be necessary to make the proposal effective. 
John Knox, The Ruggie Rules: Applying Human Rights Law to Corporations 
(forthcoming in RUGGIE’S MANDATE), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/paper 
s.cfm?abstract_id=1916664. 
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regarding corporations and human rights. While the Norms were one  
attempt at the U.N. level to have that conversation, a substantive 
evaluation of their objectives is difficult because of the controversy in 
which they were mired. In contrast, Ruggie’s work and transparent 
process in the area of business and human rights allowed the 
development of a clear and detailed map of the current terrain. What is 
more, his work has also paved the way, in some respects, for 
transformation in the future development of international human rights 
law. 
For instance, the Respect Framework and the Guiding Principles 
represent the first time that the issue of business and human rights has 
had the imprimatur of the U.N. While this might seem like a modest 
achievement, this is quite a significant milestone in light of the prior 
absence of similar attention to the matter. In addition, it appears that the 
U.N.’s work on business and human rights is continuing. Since the 
Human Rights Council’s endorsement of the Guiding Principles, it has 
established a working group whose mandate includes promoting and 
disseminating the Guiding Principles, identifying best practices on 
implementing the Guiding Principles, conducting country visits to 
various States, and “develop[ing] a regular dialogue and discuss[ing] 
possible areas of cooperation with Governments and all relevant 
actors.”212 
In addition to the impact on the human rights agenda generally, 
more specifically, the Guiding Principles’ potential impact on the 
bystander corporate accountability framework is also profound. As of 
yet, there is no corporate accountability framework that specifically 
encompasses TNCs as bystanders under international law.  Nevertheless, 
certain key elements that would be required for any effective bystander 
accountability structure have begun to take shape with the help of recent 
developments. For example, an effective bystander accountability 
framework should have at its foundation of liability, a structure that is 
not based on overt action, or even complicity, but rather on relationship. 
                                                                                                                 
 212. Human Rights Council Res., Human Rights and transnational corporations and 
other business enterprises, A/HRC/RES/17/4 (Jul. 6, 2011), available at http://daccess-
ddsny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/G11/144/71/PDF/G1114471.pdf?OpenElement. 
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To that end, both the Respect Framework and the Guiding Principles are 
significant. 
1. The tripartite relationship in human rights abuses 
An integral part of understanding the bystander framework is to 
acknowledge that, oftentimes, there are in fact three people in a 
relationship: the victim, the aggressor, and the witness.213 So, for 
instance, a TNC contracts out work to security guards (often off-duty 
militia). The security guards then commit untold horrors, harming 
people in the surrounding community. In this instance, the security 
detail are aggressors having committed the actual abuse, and the people 
in the community that suffered the abuse are victims. A lawsuit is 
brought against the TNC, but the TNC denies any involvement. Thus, 
the only reasonable role left for the TNC is that of a witness.  
Moreover, while the Norms made mention of the idea that TNCs 
need to be vigilant in their dealings with contractors214 and States,215 the 
Guiding Principles more explicitly discuss the concept of relationship as 
a basis for TNC responsibility. This concept of relationship is at the 
heart of the bystander rhetoric. The bystander framework acknowledges 
that relationships are important and that the tripartite relationship among 
victim, witness, and aggressor (whether that aggressor is the State or 
whether that aggressor is a third-party actor) can come in line with some 
of the responsibilities of TNCs. 
Likewise, in the Guiding Principles, Ruggie acknowledges that 
TNCs, not simply by their actions, but also by their relationships, can 
negatively impact human rights. Therefore, Principle 13 encourages 
TNCs to “seek to prevent or mitigate adverse human rights impacts that 
are directly linked to their . . . relationships.”216 The accompanying 
commentary further elaborates on this concept by distinguishing 
between activities (which can encompass both actions and omission) 
and relationships.217 Practically speaking, this means TNC activity can 
negatively impact human rights either through action or inaction, and 
either from its operations or its relationships. Moreover, the result is an 
                                                                                                                 
 213. Martin Amerson, supra note 10, at 48. 
 214. Norms, supra note 100, ¶ 15. 
 215. Id. ¶ 11. 
 216. Guiding Principles, supra note 8, at ¶ 13. 
 217. Id. 
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interesting diagram for mapping a bystander framework whereby a 
TNC’s actions (presumably in direct connection with its operations) can 
raise the possibility of liability, and a TNC’s inactions (in direct 
connection with its relationships) can also raise liability. In that case, a 
framework is needed that encompasses these issues and links the 
relationship that the TNC has with the aggressor, to the duty. 
2. Sphere of influence and the bystander framework 
Also noteworthy in the continuing human rights dialogue, is the 
evolution of the term ‘sphere of influence’ and its potential impact on 
the bystander framework.218 As originally used in the Global Compact, 
sphere of influence seemed operationally based—discussing spheres in 
which the company could exercise the most control. These would 
normally be those areas related to a company’s core business activities. 
This concept expanded under the Norms, where it encompassed both an 
operational form of influence and a spatial form of influence. This 
                                                                                                                 
 218. The term “sphere of influence” within the context of business and human rights 
has also evolved. Originally introduced in the Global Compact during Annan’s speech 
on the subject, the term then became a part of the first principle. However, since 2005, 
the term was struck from the first principle and is now simply a part of the preamble. 
Later, it was revealed that John Ruggie, one of the most vocal critics of the term sphere 
of influence in the U.N. Norms, confessed in April 2010 that he was actually the one 
who co-opted the term for the business and human rights framework. See Global 
Compact Critics, How Sphere of Influence Was Introduced into the Global Compact, 
GLOBALCOMPACTCRITICS.BLOGSPOT.COM (May 8, 2010), 
http://globalcompactcritics.blogspot.com/2010/05/global-compacts-principle-one-
subject.html. In fact, by the time of the 2008 Report, Ruggie argued in favor of 
abandoning the term altogether as he believed it to be “unhelpful for further elucidating 
the boundaries of the responsibility to respect.” John Ruggie, Response by John Ruggie 
to Ethical Corporation Magazine, REPORTS-AND-MATERIALS.ORG (June 5, 2008), 
http://www.reports-and-materials.org/Ruggie-response-Ethical-Corp-5-Jun-2008 
.pdf [hereinafter Response: Ethical Corp. Mag.]. For a discussion on the origins of the 
term sphere of influence see Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the 
Issue of Hum. Rts. and Transnat’l Corp. and Other Bus. Enter., Report Clarifying the 
Concepts of “Sphere of Influence” and “Complicity,” Hum. Rts. Council, U.N. Doc. 
A/HRC/8/16 (May 15, 2008) (by John Ruggie), available at http://www.reports-and-
materials.org/Ruggie-companion-report-15-May-2008.pdf. 
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expansion made room, whether intended or not,219 for the bystander 
theory to come into play. Thus, the term sphere of influence now 
implicates bystander theory. 
At its heart, the bystander framework is a methodology for shifting 
the corporate accountability dialogue away from the overt actions of a 
TNC to the impacts that a TNC’s relationships has on human rights 
violations. This shift, although not explicitly stated in the form of 
bystander rhetoric, is implicit in the U.N.’s evolving view of business 
and human rights. Therefore, it is plausible for the bystander framework 
to develop as an accountability mechanism when TNCs have significant 
relationships with would-be perpetrators of human rights atrocities. 
From this perspective, the Guiding Principles are a positive 
development. They mark a shift from an implicit acknowledgment of  
control in TNCs’ relationships (as discussed in the Global Compact) to 
an explicit acknowledgment of the importance of relationship to 
preventing human rights abuses.220 
 
                                                                                                                 
 219. Indeed, Ruggie is emphatic that sphere of influence should not be used to 
extend accountability to TNCs based on relationships. He writes: 
[I]t is not reasonable to attribute responsibility to companies solely on the basis of 
“influence” understood as “leverage.” I note that sphere of influence combines 
together two very different meanings of influence: one is influence as “impact,” 
where the company may be the cause of the harm; the other is influence as whatever 
“leverage’” a company may be able to exert over other actors with which it may or 
may not have a business relation. Impact falls squarely within a company’s 
responsibility to respect human rights; leverage may or may not, depending on 
circumstances. 
Response: Ethical Corp. Mag., supra note 218. 
  This is the leap that Ruggie seems unwilling to make but that he set up by 
developing the accountability structure. However, this is the very leap that the 
bystander framework makes by addressing the leverage that a company’s relationship 
with an actor (particularly the State) can have on human rights violations. In essence, 
Ruggie’s Reports, Framework, and Guiding Principles dance around the edges. They 
cite the problem and even discuss how relationships are important, but they do not 
address squarely the implication that an accountability structure for corporations is 
appropriate. Perhaps this disconnect is inevitable. In order to get buy-in from the 
business community, Ruggie needed to create a nonbinding mechanism, rendering him 
unable to make the leap to an accountability structure based on relationship. Until this 
structure is achieved, however, human rights violations will continue to occur and 
companies will persist in hiding behind bystander rhetoric in order to escape liability. 
 220. The relationship aspect of the bystander framework is crucial. This is the 
relationship that creates the duty and the breach of that duty that can lead to a TNC’s 
liability, even through their inaction. 
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3. The bystander framework and the  
TNC’s relationship with the State 
 
One key piece is missing from any of the frameworks articulated to 
date—the relationship between the TNC and the State. Each of the 
U.N.’s foundational documents on business and human rights looked at 
the issue of the TNC and its relationship primarily through the lens of 
the TNC’s relationship with other private parties.221 The Norms, for 
instance, specifically discussed sphere of influence within the context of 
a TNC’s work with vendors, suppliers, and other contractors. Ruggie’s 
work expands on this discussion, including weak governance zones that 
may make it difficult for a TNC to navigate human rights issues. 
However, Ruggie’s direct linkage of a TNC to a State, as a relationship 
resulting in adverse human rights impacts, is weak. For instance, in the 
Respect Framework, Ruggie discusses a corporation’s responsibility to 
respect human rights. Specifically, he addresses “the context in which a 
company is operating, its activities, and the relationship associated with 
those activities”222 as factors that should be considered in assessing that 
responsibility, without stating that a relationship with the State might be 
important to this calculation. Later, in the Respect Framework, the 
relationship between the State and the TNC appears but is understated. 
The Respect Framework discusses whether TNCs can contribute to 
abuse “through the relationships connected to their activities, such as 
with business partners, suppliers, State agencies, and other non-State 
actors.”223 State agencies are simply cast in a long line of other actors 
whose relationships with TNCs may create adverse human rights 
impacts. 
Furthermore, there are unique power dynamics in a TNC’s 
relationship with a State. The State, eager to accommodate the TNC, 
allows the TNC almost free reign, even changing its laws to make it 
                                                                                                                 
 221. Some have argued that one of the Norms’ biggest flaws is that it took that step 
when it discussed the primary relationship of the States vis-à-vis TNCs. However, the 
Norms’ language regarding the primary responsibility of States and the secondary 
responsibility of TNCs is too amorphous to be of any help in this analysis. 
 222. Respect Framework, supra note 13, ¶ 25. 
 223. Id. ¶ 57. 
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more hospitable for the TNC’s activities.224 Once it arrives, the TNC’s 
wealth and influence oftentimes dwarfs that of the Host State,225 leading 
to stark power differentials that are not taken into consideration in our 
current accountability structure.  Omitting these dynamics from current 
legal analysis has resulted in an incomplete framework, especially 
considering that many human rights abuses may arise from relationships 
between TNCs and States. In addition, the lack of explicit attention 
given to these relationships leaves open the door for improper 
assumptions that the consequences arising from TNCs’ relationships 
with States are the same as the consequences that arise from TNCs’ 
relationships with all other actors. This is clearly false and demonstrates 
how grouping these relationships together can create an inaccurate 
picture that can exacerbate the gaps in the current accountability 
structure. 
Although States can be held accountable for their acts, creating a 
separate accountability structure based on TNCs’ relationships with  
States decouples the actions (or inactions) of each actor and minimizes 
the ability of each to hide behind the acts of the other. This transparency 
is essential to the development of human rights law. In short, much of 
TNCs’ involvement today with respect to human rights abuses, if 
performed by a State, can be considered coercive and lead to legal 
accountability.226 Given TNCs’ level of power and influence, it is 
necessary to examine TNCs with the same level of scrutiny and 
accountability as States. 
                                                                                                                 
 224. For an excellent example of this, see the discussion supra Section I.B. on 
Union Carbide and the Bhopal disaster. 
 225. Martin Amerson, supra note 10, at 5. 
 226. The idea that human rights are underpinned with a freedom from coercion has 
deep jurisprudential roots and appears in many facets of business and human rights 
work. For instance, Professor Anne Marie Lofaso has written extensively on the notion 
of workers’ rights stemming from freedom from coercion. Moreover, Professor Lofaso 
points out that it is not merely the State that is a source of coercion, but also most 
institutions. See Anne Marie Lofaso, Toward a Foundational Theory of Workers’ 
Rights: The Autonomous Dignified Worker, 76 UMKC L. REV. 1, 17 (2007) (discussing 
the different jurisprudential theories regarding an individual worker and coercive 
institutions). Following this idea, it is reasonable to assume that the TNC, as an 
institution, is a large source of coercion. International law’s inability to address this is 
one of its biggest governance gaps. See Anne Marie Lofaso, Workers’ Rights as Human 
Rights: Regaining Autonomy and Human Dignity at the U.S. Workplace (forthcoming, 
peer review with Queens Law Journal).   
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In addition, a framework that does not take into account the unique 
relationship between a TNC and a State removes one of the main 
benefits of the paradigm—incentivizing proactive vigilance on the part 
of TNCs for human rights violations. Thus, accounting for this 
relationship is essential, and an effective bystander framework cannot 
allow benefits to improperly accrue to a TNC as a result of a State’s 
oppressive conduct.  
There are many other issues within the Guiding Principles and the 
Respect Framework that implicate the bystander framework.227 
However, focusing on TNCs’ relationships, particularly with the State, 
as a basis for establishing an accountability structure will go a long way 
towards developing a workable system under international law. 
Notwithstanding the benefits of the bystander framework, 
incorporating nonfeasance into a theory of accountability will no doubt 
cause consternation for TNCs and other business enterprises that have 
previously hidden behind a veil of inactivity. This is not at all surprising. 
It is also paradoxical that TNCs demand a seat at the table for all 
international dealings that might affect their bottom line—how they 
interact with their trade partners, labor, suppliers, and subsidiaries—and 
yet do not take responsibility when the fruits of those relationships, 
namely relationships with actors who commit human rights abuses, yield 
terrible results. Allowing a framework to develop that focuses on the 
nonfeasance of corporations could have a remarkable impact in 
                                                                                                                 
 227. For instance, another interesting issue that has evolved in the documents 
propounded by the U.N. and its agents is the consideration of culture as an important 
factor in changing or preventing human rights abuses. Culture is important to the 
dialogue generally because it sets the tone for what is and is not deemed acceptable. 
However, it also has greater significance for the bystander framework. Elsewhere, I 
have contended that a bystander analysis has been used even in situations where the 
TNC itself has actively participated in the harm caused. In those situations, it is the 
individual executives of TNCs who co-opt the language of the bystander framework by 
stating that their TNC’s culture is predominantly hostile to issues regarding human 
rights (or other violations), and that they themselves are mere bystanders. Martin 
Amerson, supra note 10, at 23. Emphasizing that a corporation’s culture is important 
and has a significant impact on human rights issues may close another loophole for 
high-level executives who wish to claim that they were powerless against the culture of 
a TNC. 
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diminishing human rights abuses that are linked to corporate activity. 
Knowing that their relationships with potentially responsible actors, 
including States, could be significant enough to result in liability, TNCs 
will be incentivized to engage at the highest level to ensure that the 
standards for human rights are being upheld. Executives and CEOs, for 
example, might become conversant in impact assessments that affect not 
just their bottom line, but the human rights paradigm for others. 
4. The bystander framework and the special duty of the TNC 
Another aspect of the bystander framework that may disturb the 
business community is that it has the potential to impose upon 
corporations special duties that may in certain circumstances go beyond 
the duties imposed upon States. Indeed, Ruggie flagged this as an issue 
when he stated: 
[T]he allocation of responsibilities under the Norms in actual 
practice could come to hinge entirely on the respective capacities of 
States and corporations in particular situations - so that where States 
are unable or unwilling to act, the job would be transferred to 
corporations. While this may be desirable in special circumstances 
and in relation to certain rights and obligations, as a general 
proposition it is deeply troubling.”228 
By the time Ruggie submitted his Framework and began drafting 
the Guiding Principles, there appeared to be a growing emergence in the 
discourse that relationships would need to be at the heart of business and 
human rights.229 Indeed, as noted scholar Larry Catá Backer stated: 
If at least the most advanced multinational enterprises are the 
functional equivalent of states, then they ought to undertake burdens 
commensurate with their power and effects. . . . Mr. Ruggie makes 
the quite sensible point that large and powerful enterprises cannot on 
                                                                                                                 
 228. 2006 Interim Report, supra note 34, ¶ 68. 
 229. See, e.g., Juliette Terzieff, U.N. Special Rep: Time to “Know and Show,” 
WORLD POLITICS REVIEW, Mar. 2, 2010, http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-
lines/5206/u-n-special-rep-time-to-know-and-show. 
[R]aising human rights or environmental rights abuses with corporations has been a 
pragmatic move by activists to avoid directly challenging the role of the governments 
involved. A corporation or industry can’t arrest group leaders or ban their operations. 
At the same time, corporations do have power and can exert influence on 
governments to improve rights conditions. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
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the one hand protect their power to operate unhampered within a 
framework of social norm systems, and at the same time invoke their 
formalist subordination to states under legal norm systems.230 
To that end, the Guiding Principles, and their discussion of 
relationships and spheres of influence, provide a solid theoretical basis 
from which future bystander methodologies can be drawn. 
D. The Failings of the Guiding Principles 
Nevertheless, there are a number of ways in which the Guiding 
Principles could be more effective. In the first interim report, Ruggie 
stated that “[i]t is essential to achieve greater conceptual clarity with 
regard to the respective responsibilities of States and corporations.”231 
That promise was not, in fact, fulfilled in the Respect Framework or in 
the Guiding Principles. Rather than articulate specifically the 
responsibilities of corporations, Ruggie expressed only aspirational 
goals. This may be a semantic quibble, but to the extent responsibilities 
invoke something akin to a legal duty, they are clearly absent in the 
Guiding Principles’ analysis of a corporation’s duties. Indeed, neither 
the Respect Framework nor the Guiding Principles do anything to 
remedy that governance gap. Instead, the sole legal duty continues to 
fall on States, rendering the Principles incapable of remedying situations 
where States are either unable or unwilling to do more to prevent their 
citizens from suffering human rights abuses.232 Of course, this failing is 
not unique to Ruggie’s framework. Indeed, many scholars argue that one 
                                                                                                                 
 230. Larry Catá Backer, On Challenges to Operationalizing a Transnational 
Framework for Business and Human Rights—the View From Geneva, LAW AT THE END 
OF THE DAY BLOG (Oct. 13, 2009, 9:02 AM), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2009/10 
/on-challenges-to-operationalizing.html. 
 231. 2006 Interim Report, supra note 34, ¶ 70. 
 232. This reminds me of that famous 1980s campaign “say no to drugs,” as if by 
merely stating what one should do, an issue can effectively be ended. The continued 
drug epidemic in this country shows that this is not the case. Similarly, telling States 
that they need to protect their citizens from human rights abuses does little to help those 
individuals if the international community does not provide the tools or a culture to 
make it happen. TNCs can provide both. By ascribing bystander liability to them in the 
meantime, TNCs are likely to be more proactive in curbing human rights abuses. 
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of the most fundamental failings of international human rights law is its 
one-dimensional view of the State as the duty bearer.233 Still, this failing 
is particularly exacerbated within the context of TNCs. Given how 
influential TNCs are to the international legal landscape, a framework 
that does not discuss them as duty bearers for human rights violations is 
fundamentally flawed. 
In addition, while the Respect Framework and the Guiding 
Principles offer concrete guidance in the form of impact assessment and 
due diligence standards, both seem hollow within a self-monitoring 
system. Thus, the aspirational nature of these goals will do little to 
remedy the governance gaps that exist. 
Moreover, there appears to be a gap in logic between the 2008 
Official Report’s remarks on corporate responsibility and the proposals 
put forth in the Principles. Specifically, the 2008 Report states that 
“corporate responsibility to respect rights exists independently of States’ 
duties.”234 Notably, the International Organisation of Employers, the 
International Chamber of Commerce, and the Business and Industry 
Advisory Committee to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (“OECD”) seem to share this viewpoint. In their paper 
entitled Business and Human Rights: The Role of Government in Weak 
Governance Zones, the groups, while maintaining that States have 
primary responsibility for issues arising out of human rights abuses, also 
contend that companies still have to respect the law even if the Host 
State does not.235 
If that is so, then why can we not develop an accountability 
framework that begins from the same—paradigms namely in which 
corporate accountability (or corporate duties) exist independently of 
                                                                                                                 
 233. See David Kinley & Rachel Chambers, The U.N. Human Rights Norms for 
Corporations: The Private Implications of Public International Law, 6 HUM. RTS. L. 
REV. 447. 
 234. Respect Framework, supra note 13, ¶ 55. 
 235. INT’L ORG. OF EMP’RS, BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF BUSINESS 
IN WEAK GOVERNANCE ZONES: BUSINESS PROPOSALS FOR EFFECTIVE WAYS OF 
ADDRESSING DILEMMA SITUATIONS IN WEAK GOVERNANCE ZONES ¶ 15 (Dec. 2006), 
available at http://www.business-humanrights.org/Links/Repository/596399/link_pag 
e_view (“All companies have the same responsibilities in weak governance zones as 
they do elsewhere. They are expected to obey the law, even if it is not enforced, and to 
respect the principles of relevant international instruments where national law is 
absent.”). 
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States’ duties?236 That the U.N.’s work does not even try is its main 
failing. 
CONCLUSION 
Despite initial resistance from TNCs regarding the business and 
human rights agenda, company executives now seem to understand that 
allowing a corporation to be complicit in human rights violations comes 
not just at a moral cost, but more than likely at a business cost as well.237 
                                                                                                                 
236. For instance, Ruggie believes that TNCs’ responsibilities for human rights in weak 
governance zones should still be maintained even when the State itself seems unwilling 
to prevent those abuses. See, e.g., Special Representative of the Secretary-General on 
Hum. Rts. & Transnat’l Corp. & Other Bus. Enter., 10th OECD Roundtable on 
Corporate Responsibility: Updating the Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 
discussion paper, ¶¶ 22–23 (June 30, 2010) (by John Ruggie), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/17/35/45545887.pdf. 
Weak governance zones are one case in point. Early in his mandate, the Special 
Representative asked the world’s largest international business associations to address 
this particular challenge. The updated Guidelines should incorporate their response: 
“All companies have the same responsibilities in weak governance zones as they do 
elsewhere. They are expected to obey the law, even if it is not enforced, and to respect 
the principles of relevant international instruments where national law is absent.” 
 
The challenge is more complex where national law conflicts with international 
standards and where legal compliance may undermine the corporate responsibility to 
respect human rights. Enterprises should be encouraged in such circumstances to seek 
ways to respect the spirit of international standards while avoiding outright violation 
of the law. At the same time, they should ensure that their actions do not exacerbate 
abuses or the risks to those subject to the abuse. 
Id. 
 237. See, e.g., Susan Aaronson & Ian Higham, Commentary, Re-Righting Business: 
John Ruggie and the Struggle to Develop International Human Rights Standards for 
Transnational Firms, Geo. Wash. U., Elliott School of Int’l Affairs (June 2011), 
available at http://www.business-humanrights.org/Categories/Individualcompanies/S/S 
NCFSocitNationaledesCheminsdeFer?&batch_start=11&sort_on=sortable_title (“The 
costs to the firm [for human rights abuses] may include reputational risk, legal liability, 
operational risk (such as work stoppages, boycotts, blackmail, and sabotage), and loss 
of investor or consumer confidence.”); Cynthia Williams & John Conley, Is There an 
Emerging Fiduciary Duty to Consider Human Rights?, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 75 (2005) 
(discussing how the business lobby’s position during the Supreme Court’s first ATCA 
human rights case could lead to monetary exposure for businesses that do not consider 
human rights as part of their risk assessment); Jena Martin Amerson, Business and 
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 At the same time, much of the recent debate around corporate 
accountability has centered on who is controlling the game. Most human 
rights activists believe that corporations are controlling the rules of the 
game and will continue to do so until such time as an accountability 
structure is developed for them under international law. Ruggie, in 
contrast, seems to believe that others have been controlling the game 
and that TNCs will not get the results they want unless they participate 
in the dialogue on business and human rights.238 In my view, the former 
belief is more persuasive. As one author writes: “Of course, businesses 
also spend much time and treasure attempting to influence the rules of 
the game—and ensuring that any changes to the rules, however broad or 
obvious their potential social benefits, do not affect their bottom 
lines.”239 
If we accept that corporations are indeed controlling the game, the 
significance of a bystander framework is quite obvious. Using a 
paradigm that has as its initial source of accountability the TNC’s 
relationship with perpetrators, victims could finally have a concrete 
mechanism for addressing human rights abuses in weak governance 
zones. Of course, this idea is a controversial one. Holding a non-state 
actor liable under international law takes a significant step away from 
our current normative structure of international law. Likewise,  holding 
these same non-state actors liable because of their relationships, rather 
than just looking at their actions, is at odds with most current theories of 
international law. 
In light of this uneven terrain, Ruggie’s work is a necessary interim 
step in the right direction. Ruggie brokered a compromise from 
disparate populations who had taken hard-line stances before his 
involvement—in essence, “sneaking past the watchful dragons.”240 For 
                                                                                                                 
Human Rights: What’s the Board Got to Do with It?, 2013 ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2013) (arguing that businesses that fail to consider human rights as part of their due 
diligence are facing huge monetary liability). 
 238. Interview by John Sherman, supra note 7 (discussing his approach with the 
business community regarding human rights advocacy: “What I’ve said to the 
companies is, I have a better game for you [than naming and shaming] . . . . [T]ake the 
game over and stop being reactive, and become proactive, and drive the agenda.”). 
 239. Tom Zeller Jr., Can Business Do the Job All by Itself?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/29/business/energy-environment/29green.html. 
 240. C.S. LEWIS, OF OTHER WORLDS, ESSAYS AND STORIES 56 (1966). Lewis used 
the term to connote how in some cases, using a narrative to convey an idea is more 
powerful than explicitly stating the idea in an expository form. In Lewis’s example, he 
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instance, many of the human rights groups that had initially welcomed 
the U.N. Norms realized they needed to let go of their allegiance to its 
specifics and instead embrace its spirit.241 Likewise, TNCs had to be 
more open to the idea that they were not only subject to the national 
laws of their host States, but also could be subject to other 
accountability mechanisms.242 This was an important step in establishing 
buy-in from the different stakeholders. Should a bystander framework 
subsequently be developed that holds TNCs accountable for their 
relationships with aggressors of human rights violations (the heart of the 
bystander narrative), TNCs would now be hard-pressed to object after 
contributing significant input and welcoming both Ruggie’s framework 
and the Guiding Principles.243 
Finally, discourse on Ruggie’s work and corporate accountability 
often overlooks the purpose for which Ruggie was commissioned. 
Christine Bader, one of Ruggie’s advisors during his time as Special 
Representative, noted that “John Ruggie was brought in to solve a 
particular problem, and that is to try to prevent people from getting hurt 
by corporate activity. He’s trying to ensure that there is a floor where 
there was none before.”244 To that end, the Guiding Principles may very 
well be “among the most important milestones in the recent era of 
                                                                                                                 
stated that using children’s stories to allegorize Christian theory was much more 
effective than writing an apology on the subject. Likewise, Ruggie’s aspirational tones 
and conciliatory methods may have been a much more effective way of creating TNC 
buy-in to a human rights paradigm than simply drafting a top-down accountability 
framework. Still, the jury is out regarding whether or not this method lays the 
foundation for any future, meaningful accountability structure. 
 241. See, e.g., Chris Jochnick, Making Headway on Business and Human Rights, 
OXFAM. (blog) (Feb. 11, 2011), available at http://politicsofpoverty.oxfamamerica.org/i 
ndex.php/2011/02/11/making-headway-on-business-and-human-rights/ (discussing how 
the human rights community’s view of Ruggie’s work has evolved). 
 242. Comments of Peter Frankental on the 2008 Framework. Comments part of 
International Law Discussion Group Summary Business and Human Rights: Closing 
the Gaps 8 (Nov. 6, 2008) available at http://www.chathamhouse.org/uk/files/12734_il 
p061108.pdf. 
 243. See supra notes 181-188 and accompanying text. 
 244. Interview by Jonathan T. F. Weisberg with Christine Bader, Advisor to the 
U.N. Special Rep. of the Secretary-General for Bus. & Hum. Rts., at the Yale School of 
Management (May 2009), available at http://qn.som.yale.edu/content/how-does-busine 
ss-value-human-rights. 
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corporate responsibility and sustainability, particularly given its 
emphasis on stakeholder engagement and collaboration among 
government, business and civil society.”245 
No doubt, then, its endorsement by the Council does indeed signal 
the end of the beginning. Nonetheless, many may be left           
wondering how quickly we will progress beyond that beginning.
                                                                                                                 
 245. March Murninghan, Human Rights: A Moral and Material Business Concern, 
THE MURNINGHAN POST (June 30, 2011), http://murninghanpost.com/2011/06/30/huma 
n-rights-a-moral-and-material-business-concern/. 
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APPENDIX A (A TIMELINE OF BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS) 
 1993 – 1998. Human rights organizations begin shifting 
their advocacy strategies to more directly include TNCs.246 
 1997 – 2001. John Ruggie works at the U.N. as Assistant 
Secretary-General. In that capacity he helps draft both the 
Millennium Goals and the Global Compact.247 
 1999. Kofi Annan gives his speech regarding a Global 
Compact with business. 248 
 July 2000. The U.N. Global Compact begins with 50 
signatories.249 Initially, the Compact states nine principles 
(a tenth principle against corruption was added in 2004).250 
                                                                                                                 
 246. Human rights advocates in the United States began shifting their use of ATCA 
litigation from government officials to corporations, with the first lawsuit filed against a 
corporation in 1993. Migueal Juan Taboada et al., The Accountability of Multinational 
Corporations for Human Rights’ Violations, 64/65 CUADERNOS CONSTITUCIONALES DE 
LA CÁTEDRA FADRIQUE FURIÓ CERIOL 171, 180. In addition, the first press release from 
Human Rights Watch that directly named corporations as human rights violators 
occurred on December 28, 1998. Press Release, Human Rights Watch, International 
Corporations Violate Women’s Rights in Mexico (Dec. 28, 1998), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/en/news/1998/12/28/international-corporations-violate-womens-rig 
hts-mexico. See Appendix B for more details. For a detailed discussion of the temporal 
delineations for human rights advocates targeting business, see infra note 62 and 
accompanying text. 
 247. John Ruggie, HARVARD UNIVERSITY, JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF 
GOVERNMENT, http://www.hks.harvard.edu/m-rcbg/johnruggie/index.html (last visited 
Feb. 19, 2012). 
 248. Press Release, U.N. Secretary-General, Secretary-General Proposes Global 
Compact on Human Rights, Labour, Environment, In Address to World Economic 
Forum in Davos, U.N. Press Release SG/SM 6881 (Feb. 1, 1999), available at 
http://www.pactomundial.org/recursos/doc/26323_1821822009135621.pdf. 
 249. Alan Cowell, Advocates Gain Ground in a Globalized Era, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
18, 2000, at C19. 
 250. About Us: Principle 10, UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT, http://www.ungl 
obalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/principle10.html (last visited Feb. 19, 
2012). 
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 2000. The U.N. Sub-Commission on the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights for the U.N. Commission on 
Human Rights (now the U.N. Human Rights Council) 
begins work on drafting the U.N. Norms.251 
 August 13, 2003. The Sub-Commission finalizes and 
approves the Norms.252 It submits the Norms to the full 
Commission. 
 April 4, 2004. The U.N. Commission on Human Rights put 
on hold the resolution on the Norms due to the frosty 
reception from member States.253 The Resolution also 
requests that the Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights compile a report on the various standards in 
the area of business and human rights. 254 
 February 2005. The Office of the U.N. High Commissioner 
for Human Rights publishes and submits a report to the 
U.N. Commission on Human Rights regarding business and 
human rights. It suggests that the issue remain on the 
agenda and the Norms be further considered.255 
 April 2005. The U.N. Commission on Human Rights adopts 
a resolution asking the Secretary-General to create a Special 
Representative.256 
 July 2005. Kofi Annan appoints John Ruggie for a two-year 
mandate to be the Special Representative of the U.N. 
Secretary-General on business and human rights.257 
                                                                                                                 
 251. KARL-HEINZ MODER, NORMS ON THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF TRANSNATIONAL 
CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES WITH REGARD TO HUMAN RIGHTS 3 
n.3 (Mar. 25, 2005), available at http://www.fes-globalization.org/geneva/documents/U 
N_Norms/25March04_UN-Norms_Background.pdf. 
 252. Id. at 1. 
 253. Kinley & Chambers, supra note 128, at 449. 
 254. INT’L NETWORK FOR ECON., SOC. & CULTURAL RTS., U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS 
NORMS FOR BUSINESS: BRIEFING KIT (Jan. 2005), available at http://www.escr-net.org/u 
sr_doc/Briefing_Kit.pdf. 
 255. Id. at 459. 
 256. Comm’n on Human Rights, Hum. Rts. Res. 2005/69: Human Rights and 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, 59th mtg., U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/RES/2005/69 (Apr. 20, 2005), available at www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/453 
77c80c.html. 
 257. Press Release, U.N. Secretary-General, Annan Appoints Ruggie Special 
Representative on Rights, Corporations, Businesses, U.N. NEWS CENTRE (July 29, 
2005), available at http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=15212&Cr=huma 
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 February 22, 2006. Ruggie completes and submits his 
interim report concluding that the Norms should be 
abandoned rather than pursued.258 
 April 3, 2006. The Human Rights Council is established. It 
replaces the Commission on Human Rights.259 
 February 8, 2007. Ruggie completes and submits his 
official report entitled “Business and Human Rights: 
Mapping International Standards of Responsibility and 
Accountability for Corporate Acts.”260 
 April 7, 2008. Ruggie submits his second official report 
entitled “Protect, Respect and Remedy, a Framework for 
Business and Human Rights.”261 
 June 18, 2008. The U.N. approves and endorses the 
framework unanimously and renews Ruggie’s term under a 
new mandate.262 
 April 22, 2009. Ruggie submits a third official report, 
“Business and Human Rights: Towards Operationalizing 
                                                                                                                 
n&Cr1=rights. Prior to his appointment as a Special Representative, Ruggie worked for 
then Secretary-General Kofi Annan as his former Assistant Secretary-General and 
senior advisor for strategic planning. Id. 
 258. Kinley & Chambers, supra note 128, at 450. 
 259. G.A. Res. 60/251, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/251 (April 3, 2006), available at 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/a.res.60.251_en.pdf. 
 260. Special Rep. of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Hum. Rts. and Transnat’l 
Corps. and Other Bus. Enterprises, Business and Human Rights: Mapping International 
Standards of Responsibility and Accountability for Corporate Acts, Hum. Rts. Council, 
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/035 (Feb. 9, 2007) (by John Ruggie). 
 261. Special Rep. of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Hum. Rts. and Transnat’l 
Corp. and Other Bus. Enter., Protect, Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business 
and Human Rights, Hum. Rts. Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008) (by John 
Ruggie), available at http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/issues_doc/huma 
n_rights/Human_Rights_Working_Group/29Apr08_7_Report_of_SRSG_to_HRC.pdf. 
 262. Human Rights Council Res. 8/7, Mandate of the Special Representative of the 
Secretary-General on the Issue of Hum. Rts. and Transnat’l Corp. and Other Bus. 
Enter., 28th meeting, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/8/7 (June 18, 2008), available at http://ap 
.ohchr.org/documents/E/HRC/resolutions/A_HRC_RES_8_7.pdf; see also Interview 
with John Sherman, supra note 7. 
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the ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework” to the U.N. 
Human Rights Council.263 
 April 9, 2010. Ruggie submits “Business and Human 
Rights: Further Steps Toward the Operationalization of the 
‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework” to the U.N. 
Human Rights Council.264 
 March 21, 2011. Ruggie submits “Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United 
Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework.”265 
 June 16, 2011. The U.N. Human Rights Council 
unanimously adopts the Principles.266 
                                                                                                                 
 263. Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Business and Human Rights: 
Towards Operationalizing the “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, Hum. Rts. 
Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/11/13 (Apr. 22, 2009) (by John Ruggie), available at 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/docs/11session/A.HRC.11.13.pdf. 
 264. Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Hum. Rts. and 
Transnat’l Corp. and Other Bus. Enter., Business and Human Rights: Further Steps 
Toward the Operationalization of the “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, 
Hum. Rts. Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/27 (Apr. 9, 2010) (by John Ruggie), 
available at http://198.170.85.29/Ruggie-report-2010.pdf. 
 265. Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Hum. Rts. and 
Transnat’l Corp. and Other Bus. Enter., Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, 
Hum. Rts. Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011) (by John Ruggie), 
available at http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/A-HRC-17-31_AEV.pd 
f. 
 266. Press Release, Human Rights Council, New Guiding Principles on Business 
and Human Rights Endorsed by the U.N. Human Rights Council, United Nations 
Human Rights: Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=11164&Lang
ID=E (last visited Feb. 19, 2012). 
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APPENDIX B 
Human Rights Watch (“HRW”) is a nongovernmental organization 
dedicated to research and advocacy on human rights across the world. It 
regularly produces reports and press releases to expose actions of what it 
considers violations of international human rights standards set by the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Even though typically these 
press releases are against State actors, occasionally HRW challenges 
corporations who may have violated human rights through their 
practices. The following is a comprehensive list of press releases from 
HRW against corporations, listing the date and the headline.267 Although 
many of the press releases challenge the State more than any other entity 
for allowing a given corporation to have such abusive practices, it 
nonetheless demonstrates a trend toward advocating for corporate 
accountability in human rights abuses. 
 
 Dec. 28, 1998 
“International Corporations Violate Women’s Rights in 
Mexico.” 
 Jan. 20, 1999 
“Computer Industry Must Speak Out On Chinese Internet 
Case” 
 June 25, 2000 
“China: Foreign Companies Should Protest Internet 
Detention” 
 Dec. 20, 2000 
“Human Rights Principles for Oil and Mining Companies 
Welcomed” 
 Jan. 30, 2001 
“Egypt: Cotton Co-Ops Violate Child Labor Laws” 
 Jan. 22, 2002 
“Enron: History of Human Rights Abuse in India” 
                                                                                                                 
 267. The press releases can be found on the Human Rights Watch website: 
http://www.hrw.org/news/list/40 (last visited Aug. 22, 2011). 
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 Feb. 11, 2002 
“Guatemala: Women and Girls Face Job Discrimination” 
 May 21, 2002 
“Ecuador: Escalating Violence Against Banana Workers” 
 June 11, 2002 
“ILO Members Urged to Take Action on Child Labor in 
Agriculture” 
 Aug. 9, 2002 
“Yahoo Risks Abusing Rights in China” 
 Aug. 12, 2003 
“U.N.: New Standards for Corporations and Human Rights” 
 Oct. 26, 2003 
“D.R. Congo: U.N. Must Address Corporate Role in War” 
 June 21, 2006 
“Indonesia: Military Business Threatens Human Rights” 
 Aug. 10, 2006 
“China: Internet Companies Aid Censorship” 
 Feb. 16, 2007 
“Indonesia: Government Should Pull Military Out of 
Business” 
 Apr. 30, 2007 
“US: Wal-Mart Denies Workers Basic Rights” 
 Aug. 26, 2008 
“Lebanon: Migrant Domestic Workers Dying Every Week” 
 Oct. 27, 2008 
“Burma: US Consumers Should Avoid Banned Gems” (not 
directly corporate-related but it affects jewelers) 
 June 19, 2009 
“China: Filtering Software Challenges Computer Industry” 
 Jan. 12, 2010 
“China: Google Challenges Censorship” 
 Sept. 2, 2010 
“Saudi Arabia: Domestic Worker Brutalized” 
 Sept. 2, 2010 
“US: European Corporate Hypocrisy” 
 May 9, 2011 
“Kazakhstan: Philip Morris International Overhauls Labor 
Protections” 
